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Cyberphysical systems (CPSs) integrate communication, control, and comput-
ing with physical processes. Examples include power systems, water distribution
networks, and on a smaller scale, medical devices and home control systems. Since
these systems are often controlled over a network, the sharing of information among
systems and across geographies makes them vulnerable to attacks carried out (pos-
sibly remotely) by malicious adversaries. An attack could be carried out on the
physical system, on the computer(s) controlling the system, or on the communica-
tion links between the system and the computer. Thus, significant material damage
can be caused by an attacker who is able to gain access to the system, and such
attacks will often have the consequence of causing widespread disruption to every-
day life. Therefore, ensuring the safety of information critical to nominal operation
of the system is of utmost importance. This dissertation addresses two problems in
the broad area of the Control and Security of Cyberphysical Systems.
First, we present a framework for opacity in CPSs modeled as a discrete-time
linear time-invariant (DT-LTI) system. The current state-of-the-art in this field
studies opacity for discrete event systems (DESs) described by regular languages.
However, the states in a DES are discrete; in many practical systems, it is common
for states (and other system variables) to take continuous values. We define a notion
of opacity called k-initial state opacity (k-ISO) for such systems. A set of secret
states is said to be k-ISO with respect to a set of nonsecret states if the outputs at
time k of every trajectory starting from the set of secret states is indistinguishable
from the output at time k of some trajectory starting from the set of nonsecret states.
Necessary and sufficient conditions to achieve k-ISO are presented in terms of sets
of reachable states. Opacity of a given DT-LTI system is shown to be equivalent to
the output controllability of a system obeying the same dynamics, but with different
initial conditions.
We then study the case where there is more than one adversarial observer,
and define several notions of decentralized opacity. These notions of decentralized
opacity will depend on whether there is a centralized coordinator or not, and the
presence or absence of collusion among the adversaries. We establish conditions for
decentralized opacity in terms of sets of reachable states. In the case of colluding
adversaries, we derive a condition for non-opacity in terms of the structure of the
communication graph.
We extend this work to formulate notions of opacity for discrete-time switched
linear systems. A switched system consists of a finite number of subsystems and a
rule that orchestrates switching among them. We distinguish between cases when
the secret is specified as a set of initial modes, a set of initial states, or a combination
of the two. The novelty of our schemes is in the fact that we place restrictions on: i)
the allowed transitions between modes (specified by a directed graph), ii) the number
of allowed changes of modes (specified by lengths of paths in the directed graph), and
iii) the dwell times in each mode. Each notion of opacity is characterized in terms
of allowed switching sequences and sets of reachable states and/ or modes. Finally,
we present algorithmic procedures to verify these notions, and provide bounds on
their computational complexity.
Second, we study the resilience of CPSs to denial-of-service (DoS) and integrity
attacks. The CPS is modeled as a linear structured system, and its resilience to
an attack is interpreted in a graph-theoretic framework. The structural systems
approach presumes knowledge of only the positions of zero and nonzero entries in
the system matrices to infer system properties. This approach is attractive due to the
fact that these properties will hold for almost every admissible numerical realization
of the system. The structural resilience of the system is characterized in terms of
unmatched vertices in maximum matchings of the bipartite graph and connected
components of directed graph representations of the system under attack. Further,
we establish a condition based on the zero structure of an input matrix that will
ensure that the system is structurally resilient to a state feedback integrity attack
if it is also resilient to a DoS attack.
Finally, we formulate an extension to the case of switched linear systems, and
derive conditions for such systems to be structurally resilient to a DoS attack.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Cyberphysical systems (CPSs) are complex systems in which the functioning
of the physical system is governed by computers that communicate instructions
and operational protocols over a network. The presence of a network, which may
be wired or wireless, is indicative of the fact that computational resources and
bandwidth can also affect the operation of the CPS. CPSs are ubiquitous; examples
include power systems, water distribution networks, and on a smaller scale (but
no less complex), medical devices and home control systems [1]. While computer-
controlled systems are more efficient, the sharing of information among devices and
across geographies makes the system vulnerable to attacks. An attack could be
carried out on the physical system, on the computer(s) controlling the system, or
on the communication links between the system and the computer. Moreover, these
attacks could be carried out remotely. Thus, significant material damage can be
caused by an attacker who is able to gain access to the system remotely, and such
attacks will often have the consequence of causing widespread disruption to everyday
life.
The following two examples serve to illustrate the potential damage and dis-
ruption that can be caused by an attack on a CPS:
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1. In December 2015, an attack was carried out on the power grid in Ukraine,
where attackers remotely gained access to circuit breakers which brought sev-
eral substations offline. They also remotely disabled backup power supplies,
and flooded call centers with fake calls, to prevent affected customers from
reporting complaints. This left more than 200, 000 people without electricity
for several hours. The possible impact of a similar attack on the United States
power grid is examined in [2].
2. In an experiment reported in [3], the authors carried out an attack on the
Antilock Braking System (ABS) of a vehicle. They developed a spoofer that
would inject a spurious magnetic field in order to tamper with measurements
of speed sensors located on the wheels of the vehicle. The result was that the
ABS did not work as intended because of the incorrect speed reported to it.
Further, this particular attack was completely noninvasive, in the sense that
it did not require tampering with sensors on the original system.
Several other instances of attacks on CPSs have been documented in the lit-
erature [4], [5]. A compilation of potential challenges in securing these systems to
such attacks is tabled in [6].
It is very difficult to ensure that a CPS will be immune to every possible attack.
However, it is important that all stakeholders actively work towards ensuring that
the system is resilient to a large class of attacks, and further, formulate techniques
and develop tools in order to make it difficult for an attacker to carry out an attack.
The requirements of a system to address security concerns can be given by the CIA
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Triad, as enumerated in [7]. We restate them here:
1. Confidentiality is the ability to keep information from falling into the wrong
hands. A lack of confidentiality will result in disclosure of sensitive data.
An example of a system where maintaining confidentiality is of interest is in
smart grids, where individual users supply data about their energy usage to
a utility company, which then decides on the price per unit of electricity and
the amount of electricity to be generated, among other things. However, the
users would want to keep their individual usage hidden from an eavesdropper
who might be able to use this data to determine, for instance, whether the
user is at home or not, based on their electricity consumption patterns.
2. Integrity involves maintaining accuracy and trustworthiness of data. Measures
to ensure integrity include user access controls and file permissions. A lack of
integrity will result in deception. For a CPS, maintaining integrity will enable
it to be resilient to deception attacks carried out on the sensors and actuators.
3. Availability ensures that trusted parties will have access to information on
demand. Some means to ensure availability of data include safeguards against
interruptions when data is being accessed, and backups to ensure redundancy.
A lack of availability will result in denial of service. A denial of service attack
could lead to the blocking of sensing and actuating signals, resulting in a loss
of controllability or stability of the system.
If one chooses to focus on the flow of information from the CPS to the attacker
[8, 9], to gain illicit access to a CPS (or any other system), a prospective attacker
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must be able to extract useful information pertaining to the system, which can then
be used by him or her to subvert the operation of the system. Thus, information
critical to nominal operation should be safeguarded in a well designed system. This
motivation has led researchers to develop approaches for analyzing how opaque the
system behavior is to an adversary. Opacity is a property that captures whether an
intruder, modeled as an adversarial observer, can infer a ‘secret’ of a system based
on its observation of the system behavior. The current state-of-the-art in this area
studies opacity within the framework of discrete event systems (DESs) described by
regular languages [10, 11]. Techniques from supervisory control have been used to
enforce opacity on a system [12, 13] that was not opaque initially. In other words,
it was shown that a controller could be designed to disable actions that would lead
to the leaking of the secret.
Although this theory is quite rich, a shortcoming is that it only studies the case
when the states are discrete (like in a DES). In many practical systems, it is common
for the system variables to take values in a continuous domain. This is indeed the
case in CPSs like power systems and water distribution networks. To address this,
in this dissertation, we model the CPS as a discrete-time linear time-invariant (DT-
LTI) system [14] (thus, while time steps are discrete, the state, control, and output
variables are real valued). We will use tools from control theory to study opacity
for such systems.
A second shortcoming is that a large part of the current literature that studies
the security of CPSs assumes complete knowledge of the system parameters, and
analyzes the consequences of attacks on these systems. Parameters in CPSs with a
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large number of state and measured variables are prone to variations. Conventional
methods of analysis based on these models for every possible numerical realization of
the system variables might therefore be computationally infeasible. The structural
systems approach, introduced by Lin in [15], offers a way out of this conundrum.
This technique presumes knowledge of just the zero structures (that is, the posi-
tions of zero and nonzero entries) of the system matrices to infer system properties.
This approach is attractive since these properties will hold for almost every valid
numerical realization.
1.1 Related Work
In this section, we summarize prior work in the literature that is relevant to
the two broad topics that is the focus of this dissertation.
1.1.1 Literature Review: Opacity
Opacity was first presented as a tool to study cryptographic protocols in [16].
The intruder was modeled as a passive observer who could read messages exchanged
between two parties, but could not modify, block, or send a message. The aim of the
parties was to exchange secret information without making it obvious to the intruder.
A theory of supervisory control for DESs represented by finite state automata (FSA)
and regular languages was formulated in [17,18]. This framework spawned research
in many areas including fault diagnosis [19], hybrid systems [20], and robotics [21].
DESs were used to study opacity in [10], which assumed multiple intruders
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with different observation maps. Under the assumption that the supervisor could
control all events, it was shown that there existed an optimal control that enforced
opacity. In the DES framework, the secret could have been specified as a subset of
states or a sublanguage of the system. A notion of opacity was formulated for each
instance accordingly. Verification of the opacity of a secret specified as a language
was presented in [12, 22], while [11, 23, 24] studied the same for secrets specified as
states. Language and state based notions of opacity were shown to be equivalent
in [25], where algorithms (that were polynomial in the number of states) to trans-
form one notion of opacity to the other were presented. Opacity was compared with
detectability and diagnosability of DESs, and other privacy properties like secrecy
and anonymity in [26]. A subsequent paper [27] defined opacity for DESs in a decen-
tralized framework with multiple adversaries, each carrying out its own observation
of the system.
The enforcement of opacity using techniques from supervisory control was
studied in [12, 13]. The authors of [28] formulated an alternate method of opacity
enforcement using insertion functions, which are entities that modify the output
behavior of the system in order to maintain a secret. A notion of joint opacity was
also proposed in this paper, in which a system could have been observed by multiple
adversarial observers who share their observations with a coordinator, which then
verifies opacity.
6
1.1.2 Literature Review: The Structural Approach
System- and graph-theoretic conditions were formulated and proved in [14,29]
for an attack on a cyberphysical system (modeled as a linear descriptor system sub-
ject to unkown inputs) to be undetectable and unidentifiable by monitors. In [30], for
a wireless control network modeled as a discrete-time linear time-invariant system,
under the assumption that (A,B) was stabilizable and (A,C) was detectable, the
authors presented methods to determine a subset of columns BI ⊂ B, and a subset
of rows, CJ ⊂ C such that (A,BI) was stabilizable and (A,CJ) was detectable1.
The success of different kinds of attacks on linear time-invariant (LTI) systems
in terms of the ability to ensure or disrupt controllability of a suitably modified LTI
system was characterized in [31]. It is this approach that we wish to extend to
structured linear systems. Interpreting security properties within this framework
will allow for a characterization of resilience to attacks for general classes of CPSs.
We note that [31] also modeled classes of attacks using notions from game theory,
but we do not provide an analogue in this work.
The structural design of large scale systems was studied in [32]. The input and
output matrices were designed to select the smallest number of actuated and sensed
variables to ensure structural controllability and observability. The state feedback
matrix was then designed to ensure the minimum number of input-output intercon-
nections and such that the closed loop system had no structural fixed modes2.
1Here, A,B, and C are the system, input, and output matrices of a linear time invariant system:
ẋ + Ax + Bu; y = Cx.
2For the purposes of this dissertation, it is sufficient to understand that the absence of structural
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Control selection problems have attracted a lot of attention of late. For an
LTI system, given the system matrix A, the minimal controllability problem aims
to find the sparsest input matrix B, that will ensure that the system described by
(A,B) is controllable. In the unconstrained case, this problem was shown to be
NP−hard in [33]. Interestingly, the authors of [32] showed that the minimal struc-
tural controllability problem was polynomially solvable. The minimal controllability
problem for single input structural systems was studied in [34], which showed that
this problem was solvable when a rank condition was satisfied; in the case when
no structure was imposed on the system matrix, the problem was solvable with a
single nonzero entry in the input matrix. Further, the authors of [35] showed that
the minimum constrained input selection problem was NP−hard. In this problem,
given the structures of the system and input matrices, the goal was to determine a
minimal set of indices of columns of the input matrix to ensure structural control-
lability. They also showed that if the system matrix had a certain structure, the
minimum dedicated input selection problem was polynomially solvable.
In [36], given the costs of actuating each state, the minimum cost structural
controllability problem was shown to be polynomially solvable. This work was ex-
tended to the constrained case by the authors of [37], and the minimum cost con-
strained structural controllability problem was shown to be NP−hard by deriving
a reduction from the constrained minimum input selection problem. This problem
was polynomially solvable when the system matrix was irreducible or, equivalently,
the directed graph of the system was strongly connected. We note that most of the
fixed modes will allow arbitrary placement of the closed loop poles of the system.
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recent work only deals with determining the smallest subset of the [B] matrix to
ensure controllability of the system. However, the structural controllability of the
system can also be influenced by changing the number of connections from controls
to states.
The structural controllability of switched linear systems was studied in [38],
where the authors used union graphs and colored union graphs to determine condi-
tions that would ensure structural controllability. In particular, a switched system
can be controllable even when each of its individual modes is not controllable. The
problem of determining the smallest subset of actuators needed to ensure structural
controllability of a switched system was studied in [39]. The authors also presented
a polynomial algorithm to determine such a subset of actuators. However, the prob-
lem of selecting a minimum collection of modes from among a sequence of modes
to ensure that the switched system is structurally controllable was shown to be
NP−hard.
In this dissertation, we will formulate conditions to ensure the structural re-
silience of a system to an attack in relation to the structural controllability of the
system after a subset of its inputs are ‘disconnected’.
1.2 Contributions of this Dissertation
1.2.1 Developing a Unified Framework for Opacity in Cyberphysical
Systems
The contributions as a result of this work are listed below:
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1. For CPSs represented as a discrete-time linear time-invariant system with a
single adversarial observer, we define a notion of opacity at a time k called
k-initial state opacity (k-ISO) [40]. A set of secret states is said to be k-ISO
with respect to a set of nonsecret states if the outputs at time k of every
trajectory starting from the set of secret states cannot be distinguished from
the output at time k of some trajectory starting from the set of nonsecret
states. Necessary and sufficient conditions to achieve k-ISO are presented in
terms of sets of reachable states. Opacity of a given DT-LTI system is shown
to be equivalent to the output controllability of a system obeying the same
dynamics, but with different initial conditions.
2. We extend this to the case when there is more than one adversarial ob-
server [41], where we define several notions of decentralized opacity. These
notions of decentralized opacity will depend on whether there is a centralized
coordinator or not, and the presence or absence of collusion among the adver-
saries. Conditions for decentralized opacity will be established in terms of sets
of reachable states. In the case of colluding adversaries, we derive a condition
for nonopacity in terms of the structure of the communication graph.
3. Finally, we formulate notions of opacity for switched linear systems (SLSs) [42].
An SLS consists of a finite number of linear subsystems (called modes) and a
rule that governs the switching among them. Many practical systems can be
modeled as operating in one of several modes, often switching from one mode
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of operation to another3. We will distinguish between the cases when the
secret is specified as an initial mode, an initial state, or a combination of the
two, and whether the adversary will observe a mode, a function of the state,
or a combination of the two. Constraints will be placed on the modes that
the system will be allowed to transition into from a given mode and we will
impose bounds on the dwell times in each mode. Moreover, constraints will
be imposed on the number of changes of modes before the adversary makes its
observation in our definitions of opacity for SLSs. In each case, we will present
conditions that will establish that particular notion of opacity. We will also
enumerate algorithmic procedures that provide conservative upper bounds on
the computational complexity to verify these notions of opacity.
This body of work follows a natural progression, in that we will start by for-
mulating notions of opacity for linear time-invariant systems with a single adversary,
extend this to the case of multiple adversaries, and finally combine the DES frame-
work with ours to establish notions of opacity for switched linear systems [46].
1.2.2 Characterizing the Structural Resilience of Cyberphysical Sys-
tems to Attacks
For the structural resilience problem, the CPS is modeled as a linear struc-
tured system, and structural conditions for an attack to be successful, in terms of
3Further, it has been shown that switching control strategies can achieve better control perfor-
mance than nonswitching strategies. The reader is referred to [43], [44], [45] for an introduction
to the design and control of switched systems.
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disrupting or obtaining controllability of a (modified) linear structured system are
provided. The structural resilience of the system to denial of service (DoS) attacks
and integrity attacks is characterized in terms of the structural controllability of
an associated linear structured system. Specifically, the contribution in this area is
threefold:
1. First, we characterize the structural resilience of the system in terms of un-
matched vertices in maximum matchings of the bipartite graph and connected
components of the directed graph representations of the system under at-
tack [47].
2. Next, we present conditions under which a system that is already structurally
resilient to a DoS attack will also be structurally resilient to a type of integrity
attack called a state feedback integrity attack.
3. Finally, we provide extensions to the case of switched linear systems. Switched
linear systems are systems that can operate in one of several modes, each
of which is a linear system, and can switch from one mode of operation to
another [48]. We derive graph-theoretic conditions for the structural resilience
of such systems to DoS attacks.
1.3 Outline of Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 gives a review of the notions of opacity studied for discrete event
systems, and an introduction to structured linear systems and graph theory. We
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will define several terms that will be needed to understand the results presented in
subsequent chapters.
Notions of opacity for continuous state systems is the subject of Chapters 3,
4, and 5, where we focus on linear time-invariant systems with a single adversar-
ial observer, linear time-invariant systems with multiple adversarial observers, and
switched linear systems respectively. The various notions of opacity are character-
ized in terms of sets of reachable states.
Chapter 6 presents a characterization of the resilience of a cyberphysical sys-
tem (CPS) modeled as a linear structured system to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
The resilience of the system to an attack is interpreted in terms of unmatched vertices
in maximum matchings of bipartite graph, and connected components of directed
graph representations of the system under attack.




This chapter presents a review of the notions of opacity studied for discrete
event systems, and an introduction to structured linear systems and graph theory,
and defines several terms that will be needed to understand the results in this
dissertation.
Notions of opacity for discrete event systems are presented in Section 2.1.
A DES is typically modeled as a finite state automaton, and the secret can be
specified as a subset of states or a sublanguage of this automaton. The reader is
referred to [11, 25, 26] for a more detailed exposition on opacity for discrete event
systems.
Section 2.2 provides an introduction to structured linear systems. The struc-
tural approach presumes knowledge of only the zero structures of the matrices in a
linear time-invariant model of the CPS under consideration. This characterization
can be thought of as a representation of how the variables (state, input, and output
variables, as the case may be) of the system influence one another. Furthermore,
this approach naturally lends itself to representations of the system as directed and
bipartite graphs. Section 2.3 is a primer on graph theory. The interested reader is
referred to the survey paper [49] for a more detailed exposition and references to
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prior work in this area.
2.1 Opacity for Discrete Event Systems
2.1.1 Languages and Automata
Let Σ be an alphabet, and let Σ∗ be the set of all strings of elements from
Σ of finite length, including the empty string ε. A language L is a subset of the
strings of finite length in Σ∗. Let G = (X,Σ, f,X0) be an finite state automaton,
where X is a nonempty set of states, X0 ⊆ X is a nonempty set of initial states,
and Σ represents the set of events. f : X × Σ→ X is the (partial) state transition
function: given x, y ∈ X and σ ∈ Σ, f(x, σ) = y if the execution of σ from x takes
the system to y. We write f(x, σ)! if f(x, σ) is a valid transition. The transition
function is extended to f : X × Σ∗ → X in the usual recursive way:
f(x, ε) := x
f(x, se) := f(f(x, s), e) for s ∈ Σ∗, e ∈ Σ.
The language generated by G is L(G) := {s ∈ Σ∗ : f(x, s)!}, and describes all
possible trajectories of the system. Let K1 and K2 be sublanguages of L(G).
Let P : Σ∗ → Σ∗ be a projection map. Then, if a string of events s occurs in
the system, an external agent would see P (s). P can be extended from strings to
languages as follows: for languages L, J ⊆ Σ∗, define
P (L) = {t ∈ Σ∗ : (∃s ∈ L)t = P (s)}
P−1(J) = {t ∈ Σ∗ : P (t) ∈ J}
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2.1.2 Notions of Opacity
A secret specification (states, or language) will be opaque with respect to a
nonsecret specification if every secret execution (will be made clear subsequently) is
indistinguishable from a nonsecret execution. The notion of opacity under consid-
eration will depend on how the secret is specified (sublanguage, set of initial states,
or set of current states).
Definition 2.1. K1 is strongly language based opaque (LBO) with respect to K2
and P if for every trajectory in K1, there exists a trajectory in K2 that ‘looks’ the
same under P , i.e. K1 ⊆ P−1(P (K2)).
Definition 2.2. K1 is weakly LBO with respect to K2 and P if there exists a
trajectory in K1 that is confused with some trajectory in K2, under P , i.e. K1 ∩
P−1(P (K2)) 6= φ.
Definition 2.3. Given G with Xs, Xns ⊆ X0, and P , Xs is initial state opaque
(ISO) with respect to Xns and P if for every i ∈ Xs and every t ∈ L(G, i) such that
f(i, t) is defined, there exists j ∈ Xns and t′ ∈ L(G, j) such that f(j, t′) is defined
and P (t) = P (t′).
Definition 2.4. Given G with Xs, Xns ⊆ X, and P , Xs is current state opaque
(CSO) w.r.t. Xns and P if for every i ∈ X0 and t ∈ L(G) such that f(i, t) ∈ Xs,
there exists j ∈ X0 and t′ ∈ L(G) such that f(j, t′) ∈ Xns and P (t) = P (t′).
These state-based and language-based definitions are essentially equivalent,
since it has been shown that there exist algorithms polynomial in the number of
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states that relate any pair of the notions of opacity [25].
2.1.3 Examples
Example 2.5. [25] Consider the FSA G shown in Figure (2.1). Let the set of
observable events be given by Σo = {a, b, c}. It is language based opaque when Ls =
{abd} and Lns = {abcc∗d, adb} because whenever the intruder sees P (Ls) = {ab}, it
is not sure whether the string abd or the string adb has been executed. Notice that
this system is not LBO if Ls = {abcd} and Lns = {adb}. No string in Lns appears
the same as the secret string abcd.
Figure 2.1: Language Based Opacity
Example 2.6. [23]
Consider the FSA G in Figure (2.2), with Σo = {a, b}, Xs = {x3} and Xns =
X \ Xs. Xs is intial state opaque with respect to Xns because for every string s
starting from x3, there is another string εs starting from x1, that looks the same.
However, ISO does not hold if Xs = {x1}. In this case, whenever the intruder sees
the string aa, it is sure that the system started from Xs (i.e., no other initial state
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Figure 2.2: Initial State Opacity
can generate a string that appears the same as aa).
2.2 Structured Linear Systems
Consider the linear time-invariant system
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) (2.1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn, u(t) ∈ Rp, A ∈ Rn×n and B ∈ Rn×p.
Definition 2.7. The system in Equation (2.1) is said to be controllable if for every
initial state x(0) = x0 and final state x(tf ) = xf , there exists an input u(·) on [0, tf ]
that transfers the system from x0 to xf .
Verifying the controllability of an LTI system of the form in Equation (2.1)
where the states and inputs are defined on finite dimensional vector spaces is equiv-
alent to checking a matrix rank condition, as stated in the following result.
18
Theorem 2.8. [50] The system in Equation (2.1) is controllable if and only if
rank(
(
B AB . . . An−1B
)
) = n.
The notions of structured linear systems and structural controllability were
introduced by Lin in [15]. This framework assumes knowledge of only the zero
stuctures, [A] ∈ {0, ∗}n×n and [B] ∈ {0, ∗}n×p, of A and B respectively. That is,
every entry in [A] and [B] is either a fixed zero or a free parameter. [A] and [B] are
called structured matrices.
The rows and columns of [A] indicate how the states of the system influence
one another. A nonzero entry aij ∈ [A] indicates that the jth component of the state
vector, xj, influences changes in the i
th component, xi (the j
th and ith entries in the
state vector of dimension n). The rows and columns of [B] indicate how inputs to
the system influence the states. In this case, a nonzero entry bij ∈ [B] indicates
that a change in xi is influenced by the input uj (the j
th entry in the input vector of
dimension p). A zero entry in either case would imply the lack of an interconnection
between corresponding state and/ or input variables.
The reader is encouraged to think of the structured representation of a system
in the following way:
Example 2.9. Consider a symmetric structured matrix [H] ∈ {0, ∗}n×n that is rep-
resentative of a power system. The dimension of [H], n, is indicative of the number
of components in the system (generators, transformers, loads). A free parameter
hij = ∗ signifies that there is a wire connecting components i and j, with the di-
rection of current through the wire from j to i. Likewise, a fixed zero entry in [H]
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corresponds to the absence of a wire between the respective components. hij = ∗ is
an indicator of the fact that changes in the numerical value of a parameter asso-
ciated with component j influences changes in the numerical value of a parameter
associated with component i. This parameter could be the current flowing through
the component, or the voltage drop across the component, and is not precluded from
being set to (the numerical value) zero. For example, when two purely resistive loads
are connected to each other, hij = hji = ∗; this free parameter can be assumed to
take the numerical value 0 when both these loads are isolated from a source.
Remark 2.10. In the sequel, the components of the state (input) vectors will cor-
respond to state (input) vertices in a directed graph. As we will describe in the next
part of this section, the edges in this graph will be determined by the [A] and [B]
matrices.
A matrix H ∈ Rm×n with the same zero structure as the structured matrix
[H] ∈ {0, ∗}m×n is called an admissible numerical realization of [H].
Definition 2.11. ([A], [B]) is structurally controllable if there exists an admissible
numerical realization (A,B) that is controllable.
Remark 2.12. If ([A], [B]) is structurally controllable, then almost every admissible
numerical realization will be controllable1.
1Some authors refer to such a system as generically controllable [49]
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2.3 Graph Theory
Directed graphs (digraphs) provide an elegant means to represent linear struc-
tured systems [32]. Properties of the system such as controllability and observability
can be inferred from a digraph associated with the system, and independently of
numerical values of parameters. This makes it an attractive tool to study large
scale, complex systems, on which performing computations using numerical values
of variables will invariably be costly. Consider the linear structured system
ẋ(t) = [A]x(t) + [B]u(t) (2.2)
where, x(t) ∈ Rn, u(t) ∈ Rp, [A] ∈ {0, ∗}n×n and [B] ∈ {0, ∗}n×p.
The directed graph of the structured system is D = (V , E), where:
• V = {u1, . . . , um, x1, . . . , xn} := {U ,X};
• E = EA ∪ EB, where EA = {(xj, xi)|[A]ij 6= 0}, EB = {(uj, xi)|[B]ij 6= 0}.
A sequence of directed edges {(v1, v2), (v2, v3), . . . , (vk−1, vk)} is a simple path
from v1 to vk if the vertices v1, . . . , vk are all distinct. The simple path described
above, with an additional edge, (vk, v1), or a vertex with a self loop, is called a cycle.
A vertex w2 is reachable from another vertex w1 if there exists a simple path from
w1 to w2. Let V1,V2 ⊆ V . Two paths from V1 to V2 are disjoint if they consist of
disjoint sets of vertices. A set of v mutually disjoint and simple paths from V1 to
V2 is a linking of size v from V1 to V2. A cycle family is a set of mutually disjoint
cycles. A U−rooted path is a simple path with source vertex in U . A U−rooted path
family is a set of mutually disjoint U−rooted paths.
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A digraph Ds = (Vs, Es) is a subgraph of D if Vs ⊆ V and Es ⊆ E . If Vs = V ,
then Ds is said to span D. A subgraph Ds satisfying a property P is maximal if
there is no other subgraph Ds′ such that Ds is a strict subgraph2 of Ds′ and property
P holds for Ds′ .
D is strongly connected if there is a simple path from each vertex to every
other vertex in the graph. A strongly connected component (SCC) is a maximal
subgraph DS, of D, such that DS is strongly connected. With SCCs as supernodes
(an agglomeration of vertices of the graph), one can generate a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) in which each supernode corresponds to an SCC, and there exists a directed
edge between two SCCs if and only if there exists a directed edge connecting vertices
in the SCCs in the original digraph. An SCC is linked if it has at least one incoming
(outgoing) edge to (from) its vertices from (to) vertices of another SCC. An SCC is
non top (bottom) linked if it has no incoming (outgoing) edges to (from) its vertices
from (to) vertices of another SCC3.
A bipartite graph is a graph whose vertices can be divided into two disjoint sets
V1 and V2 such that every edge in the graph is from a vertex in V1 to a vertex in V2, or
from a vertex in V2 to a vertex in V1. The bipartite graph is denoted B(V1,V2, EV1,V2).
In this dissertation, we will restrict our discussion to bipartite graphs in which all
edges are directed from V1 to V2, that is, EV1,V2 ⊂ {(v1, v2)|v1 ∈ V1, v2 ∈ V2}.
B(V1,V2, EV1,V2) can also be associated with a matrix H with |V1| columns and |V2|
2A subgraph is strict if it is the case that at least one of Vs ⊂ V or Es ⊂ E holds.
3Non top (bottom) linked SCCs are called source (sink) SCCs in the graph theory literature.
In this document, however, we will use the terminology from [32].
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rows, with EV1,V2 = {(v1j , v2i) : [H]ij 6= 0}. Given B(V1,V2, EV1,V2), a matching is a
subset of edges that do not share vertices. A maximum matching is a matching that
has the largest number of edges. Vertices not belonging to a maximum matching are
called unmatched. An unmatched vertex v2 ∈ V2 (respectively, v1 ∈ V1) is called a
right unmatched vertex (left unmatched vertex ). A perfect matching is a maximum
matching with no unmatched vertices.
The bipartite graph associated with a directed graph D(V , E) is constructed in
the following way [51]: to each vi ∈ V , we associate two vertices ui and wi. There is
a directed edge from ui to wj in the new graph if and only if there is an edge from
vi to vj in D(V , E). We abuse notation by using B(V ,V , E) to denote the bipartite
graph associated with D(V , E).
The following example will help in making the preceding discussion clear.
Example 2.13. Figure (2.3) shows the directed graph and bipartite graph represen-
tations corresponding to the system matrix [A] given below:
[A] =

0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 0
0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 ∗
0 0 0 0 ∗ ∗ 0

The strongly connected components of the directed graph, D([A]), are the ver-
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Figure 2.3: Structured system of Example 2.13 as a graph
tices within each dotted box. The dotted boxes in green (comprising the vertex (v5)
and the vertices (v1, v2, v3)) represent the non top-linked SCCs. The bipartite graph
representation, B([A]) is got by duplicating each vertex of the directed graph, and
the edges are determined by the edges in D([A]). The edges of B([A]) in blue form a
maximum matching. Removing the vertices that are incident on edges in the max-
imum matching, we see that w3 and w5 are right unmatched vertices. Notice that
this maximum matching is not unique. Another maximum matching could be got by
removing the edge (u2 → w4) from the previous maximum matching and adding the
edge (u2 → w3). The right unmatched vertices of this maximum matching will be w4
and w5.
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2.4 Scope of this Dissertation
This chapter was a means to bring the reader up to speed on the background
material relevant to the susbequent chapters. It is evident that the treatment of
opacity in the literature only considers a very restricted class of systems, namely,
discrete event systems. One of the goals of this dissertation is to define and analyze
notions of opacity that might be applicable to larger classes of systems that might
comprise general cyberphysical systems. The second goal is to leverage the tools and
techniques of the structural approach to characterize the resilience of a cyberphysical
system to denial-of-service attacks. We will then extend these results to other types
of attacks, and more general structured systems.
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Chapter 3: Opacity for Linear Systems: The Single Adversary Case
Although the presentation of opacity for discrete event systems is well-motivated
and elegant, a shortcoming of the framework is that it only addresses the case when
the states of the system are discrete. The states in CPSs like power systems and
water networks are typically real valued. It is this gap that we seek to bridge in this
dissertation, by formulating notions of opacity for continuous state systems. The
system is modeled as a discrete-time linear time-invariant system. Therefore, while
the time steps are discrete, the state, input and output variables are real valued.
We use tools from control theory to study opacity for such systems.
We define a notion of opacity at a time k called k-initial state opacity (k-ISO)
in Section 3.1. A set of secret states is said to be k-ISO with respect to a set of
nonsecret states if the outputs at time k of every trajectory starting from the set of
secret states can not be distinguished from the output at time k of some trajectory
starting from the set of nonsecret states. Necessary and sufficient conditions to
achieve k-ISO are presented in terms of sets of reachable states in Section 3.2.
Section 3.3 studies k-ISO under unions and intersections of sets of states. Opacity
of a given DT-LTI system is shown to be equivalent to the output controllability of
a system obeying the same dynamics, but with different initial conditions in Section
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3.4. Finally, the necessity of indistinguishability of outputs in the definition of k-ISO
is relaxed, and we define a notion of ε-opacity in Section 3.5.
3.1 Opacity for LTI Systems
Consider the system:
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t)
x(0) = x0 ∈ X0
y(t) = Cx(t) (3.1)
where x ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rm, y ∈ Rp, and A,B,C are matrices of appropriate dimensions
containing real entries.
Let K be a set of positive integers, corresponding to the instants of time at
which the adversary makes an observation of the system. The subscript s (ns),
when appended to the states, inputs, and outputs, will correspond to trajectories
that start from the set of initial secret (nonsecret) states. The adversary is assumed
to have knowledge of the initial sets of secret and nonsecret states, Xs and Xns,
the system model (A,B), and its own observation map C. Further, we assume
that it has unlimited computing power, in that it will be able to compute the sets
of reachable states at time k. Its goal is to deduce, on the basis of observing the
system at times k ∈ K, whether the system started from a state in Xs or not.
Definition 3.1. For the system (3.1), given Xs, Xns ⊂ X0 and k ∈ K, Xs is
strongly k-initial state opaque (k-ISO) with respect to Xns if for every xs(0) ∈ Xs
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and for every sequence of admissible controls us(0), . . . , us(k − 1), there exist an
xns(0) ∈ Xns and a sequence of admissible controls uns(0), . . . , uns(k − 1) such that
ys(k) = yns(k).
Xs is strongly K-ISO with respect to Xns if Xs is strongly k-ISO with respect
to Xns for all k ∈ K.
This means that starting from any secret state and applying any sequence of
k admissible controls (corresponding to the instants the adversary makes an obser-
vation), the system will reach a state whose observation to the adversary will be
indistinguishable from the observation of a state that can be reached by the appli-
cation of an admissible control sequence of length k, starting from some nonsecret
state. While this notion calls for every state in the set of initial secret states to be
indistinguishable (after some time k) from some state in the initial set of nonsecret
states, the following definition relaxes this requirement.
Definition 3.2. For the system (3.1), given Xs, Xns ⊂ X0 and k ∈ K, Xs is weakly
k-ISO with respect to Xns if for some xs(0) ∈ Xs and for some sequence of admissible
controls us(0), . . . , us(k−1), there exist an xns(0) ∈ Xns and a sequence of admissible
controls uns(0), . . . , uns(k − 1) such that ys(k) = yns(k).
Xs is weakly K-ISO with respect to Xns if Xs is weakly k-ISO with respect to
Xns for all k ∈ K.
These definitions of opacity for LTI systems is different from familiar defini-
tions of observability. The observability problem aims to determine the initial state
x(0), given the entire output and control histories. Here, however, the adversary
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aims to determine x(0) via access to only snapshots of the output and the set of
possible controls. The small number of observations of the system is motivated by
the following:
1. the adversary might not want to reveal its presence.
2. the adversary might not have the resources to continuously monitor the system.
Throughout this document, the set K is arbitrary.
Our formulation is also different from definitions of opacity in the DES litera-
ture. In those cases, the observation of the entire secret trajectory had to coincide
with that of a nonsecret trajectory. We only need that the secret and nonsecret
outputs at time k coincide. k-ISO also differs from the notion of k-step opacity pro-
posed in [52]. In their formulation, k-step opacity was achieved when the adversary
did not know if the system entered a secret state in k previous steps. We require
that the ambiguity exist only at time k. It will subsequently become evident that an
additional requirement to our conditions for k-ISO will also establish k-step opacity.
Finally, k-ISO is also different from the notion of simulation relations between
dynamical systems [53]. Simulation relations typically verify the ‘equality’ of two
systems governed by different dynamics. In our framework, however, we try to
identify equivalence classes of outputs at time k. Opacity is deemed to have been
achieved if the system starting from two disjoint sets of states at time 0 reaches the
same equivalence class of outputs at time k.
Example 3.3. The illustration in Figure (3.1) will be useful to motivate k-ISO.








Figure 3.1: k-ISO Motivation: ATM Money Transfer
ATM machine.
One way for the bank to do this in a ‘secure’ manner would be to equip the
truck with the best defenses that money can buy. However, this might not be a
cost-effective solution, since customizations might be very expensive, and need to be
continuously updated to stay ahead of potential attackers. An alternative approach
would be for the bank to deploy several identical trucks, only some of which carry
money. This is a reasonable strategy for the bank to adopt, under the assumption
that the cost of carrying out an attack on a truck is very high. The motion of a
truck can be represented as a state space equation with the position and velocity of
the truck as the states, and acceleration as the input. Then, assuming unit mass,
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The position of the truck at a time k is given by:
p(k) = p(0) + kv(0) +
k−1∑
i=0
(k − i− 0.5)a(i)
Let the locations at which the money is loaded (represented by $$$) comprise
the set of secret states (Xs), and the initial locations of the other trucks (represented
by XXX) comprise the set of nonsecret states (Xns). Then, if an adversary observes
p(k) at some time k, Xs will be k-ISO with respect to Xns if it cannot determine
whether the truck started from a location from where money was loaded into it.
That is, for every possible location (at time 0) at which money was loaded, there is
a corresponding location (at time 0) where there was no money loaded such that the
positions of the trucks which start from these locations are the same at time k.
3.2 Opacity and Reachable Sets of States
The adversary has complete knowledge of the system model, and the sets of
initial secret and nonsecret states. However, it does not know the exact control
sequence applied in the time interval [0, k]; it only has knowledge of the sets of
allowed inputs that can be applied. In this light, a possible means of checking that
opacity holds is by relating it to reachability. In this section, we present necessary
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and sufficient conditions to establish k-ISO in terms of sets of reachable states of
the system.
Let Uks := {us(0), . . . , us(k − 1)} and Ukns := {uns(0), . . . , uns(k − 1)}. Let
Xs(k) and Xns(k) denote the sets of states reachable in k steps, starting at time 0












{x : x(i+ 1) = Ax(i) +Bu(i),∀i < k} (3.3)
Theorem 3.4. The following hold:
1. Xs is strongly k-ISO with respect to Xns if and only if CXs(k) ⊆ CXns(k).
2. Xs is strongly K-ISO with respect to Xns if and only if CXs(k) ⊆ CXns(k) for
all k ∈ K.
Proof. First, let strong k-ISO hold. Then, for all xs(0) ∈ Xs, and all {us(·)}k−10 ,
there exist xns(0) ∈ Xns and {uns(·)}k−10 such that ys(k) = yns(k). Now, starting
from Xs (respectively Xns), and applying k admissible controls, one reaches a state
in Xs(k) (Xns(k)). Therefore, k-ISO ensures that for every xs(k) ∈ Xs(k), there
exists xns(k) ∈ Xns(k), such that ys(k) = yns(k). This gives CXs(k) ⊆ CXns(k).
Next, let CXs(k) ⊆ CXns(k). This means for every xs(k) ∈ Xs(k), there
exists xns(k) ∈ Xns(k), such that ys(k) = yns(k). Since Xs(k) and Xns(k) are the
sets of reachable states starting from Xs and Xns respectively, the previous sentence
translates to: for every xs(0) ∈ Xs and every {us(·)}k−10 , there exist xns(0) ∈ Xns
and {uns(·)}k−10 such that ys(k) = yns(k). This, by definition, is strong k-ISO.
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The second statement of the theorem easily follows by extending the previous
argument to all k ∈ K.
Remark 3.5. This result can be easily extended to verify k-step opacity if CXs(k) ⊆
CXns(k) for all k ∈ K := {m,m− 1, . . . ,m− k + 1} for some positive integer m.
Remark 3.6. Xs(k) ⊆ Xns(k) is only a sufficient condition for Xs to be strongly
k-ISO with respect to Xns. To see that this condition is not necessary, let C =(
1 1 1
)








. Then, CXs(k) = CXns(k),
establishing k-ISO, even though Xs(k) 6⊆ Xns(k).
Similar results hold for weak k-ISO. The proofs follow identically.
Theorem 3.7. The following hold:
1. Xs is weakly k-ISO with respect to Xns if and only if CXs(k) ∩CXns(k) 6= φ.
2. Xs is weakly K-ISO with respect to Xns if and only if CXs(k) ∩ CXns(k) 6= φ
for all k ∈ K.
Remark 3.8. Xs(k)∩Xns(k) 6= φ is a sufficient condition for Xs to be weakly k-ISO
with respect to Xns.
Figures 3.2a, 3.2b, and 3.2c respectively show the representations of strong
k-ISO, weak k-ISO, and non-opacity in terms of sets of reachable states at time k.
3.3 k-ISO Under Set Operations
Properties of k-ISO are studied under unions and intersections. The properties





Figure 3.2: Representations of strong, weak, and non-opacity in terms of sets of
reachable states
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of initial states, and X(k) be the set of states reachable in k steps, starting from X
at time 0.
We first study the effect of the set union operation on k-ISO. Lemmas 3.9 and
3.10 establish basic results on sets of reachable states and outputs under set union.
Lemma 3.9. Given sets of initial states X1, X2, · · · ⊆ X, the reachable set in k
steps of their union is equal to the union of the reachable sets in k steps of each set













Xi),∃{u(·)}, (3.1) holds ∀i < k, x(k) = x
⇔[(∃x0 ∈ X1 ∧ ∃{u(·)}) s.t. (x ∈ X1(k))]∨























Xi(k) such that y = Cx
⇔(y = Cx ∧ x ∈ X1(k)) ∨ (y = Cx ∧ x ∈ X2(k)) ∨ . . .





Lemmas 3.9 and 3.10 are used to study k-ISO under set union, as stated in
Theorems 3.11 and 3.12.
Theorem 3.11. If Xsi is k-ISO with respect to Xns for each i, then
⋃
iXsi is k-ISO
with respect to Xns.
Proof.













Xsi is k − ISO w.r.t. Xns
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Theorem 3.12. If Xs is k-ISO w.r.t. Xnsi for each i, then Xs is k-ISO w.r.t.⋃
iXnsi
Proof.














We now turn our attention to k-ISO under set intersection. Lemmas 3.13
and 3.14 establish basic results on sets of reachable states and outputs under set
intersection. These results will be useful while studying k-ISO under set intersection,
as we will show in Theorems 3.16 and 3.17.
Lemma 3.13. Given sets of initial states X1, X2, · · · ⊆ X, the reachable set in k
steps of the intersection of the sets of initial states is contained in the intersection













Xi),∃{u(·)}, (3.1) holds ∀i < k, x(k) = x
⇒[(∃x0 ∈ X1 ∧ ∃{u(·)}) s.t. (x ∈ X1(k))]∧






















Xi(k) such that y = Cx
⇔(y = Cx ∧ x ∈ X1(k)) ∧ (y = Cx ∧ x ∈ X2(k)) ∧ . . .





Remark 3.15. The reverse inclusions need not hold in Lemmas 3.13 and 3.14. Let
C = I, X1 = Xs and X2 = Xns. X1 ∩ X2 = ∅, but X1(k) ∩ X2(k) need not be
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empty1.
Theorem 3.16. If Xsi is k-ISO with respect to Xns for each i, then
⋂
iXsi is k-ISO
with respect to Xns.
Proof.













Xsi is k − ISO w.r.t. Xns
Theorem 3.17. If Xs is k-ISO with respect to Xnsi for each i, then CXs(k) ⊆⋂










However, we can have
⋂
iXnsi = ∅, which means C(
⋂
iXnsi)(k) is undefined.
1Recall that the definition of the reachable set in k steps assumes a nonempty initial set of
states.
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Theorem 3.18 and Remark 3.19 are similar results for weak opacity.
Theorem 3.18. If Xsi is weakly k-ISO with respect to Xns for each i, then
⋃
iXsi
is weakly k-ISO with respect to Xns.
Proof.



















Xsi is weakly k − ISO w.r.t. Xns
Remark 3.19. If Xsi is weakly k-ISO with respect to Xns for each i, then
⋂
iXsi









CXns(k) will not be defined.
3.4 Opacity and Output Controllability
A state of the system is said to be controllable if we can find an input that
transfers the state to the origin in finite time. While there are several interesting
results in the literature that relate controllability of a dynamical system to other
properties of interest, the notion of output controllability has been largely over-
looked. Output controllability is the ability of transferring the state of the system
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such that the output corresponding to the state at some finite time is zero. It is
easy to see that while controllability implies output controllability, the reverse need
not necessarily hold. In fact, output controllability will imply controllability if the
matrix C has full rank. This section establishes an equivalence between k-ISO and
output controllability.
Definition 3.20. A state x of (3.1) is controllable on [0, kf ] if there exists a control
sequence {u(·)} that transfers the state of the system from x(0) = x to x(kf ) = 0.
The output of (3.1) at time k is given by:




Definition 3.21. A state x of (3.1) is output controllable on [0, kf ] if there exists a
control sequence {u(·)} that transfers the system from x(0) = x to x(kf ), such that
y(kf ) = 0.
Theorem 3.22 indicates that Xs being k-ISO with respect to Xns ensures that
there exists a state that is output controllable. Theorem 3.23 establishes the converse
result, under an additional assumption.
Theorem 3.22. Let Xs be (strongly or weakly) k-ISO with respect to Xns. Then
there exists a state of (3.1) that is output controllable on [0, k]. Further, if k-ISO is
established for the pair (xs(0), xns(0)) ∈ Xs×Xns (and appropriate control sequences
{us(·)} and {uns(·)}), then the control sequence u(i) = us(i)−uns(i), i = 0, 1, . . . , k−
1, will achieve output controllability for the initial state x(0) = xs(0)− xns(0).
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Proof. k-ISO implies ys(k) = yns(k) for appropriate xs(0), {us(·)}, xns(0) and {uns(·)}.
Setting x(0) = xs(0) − xns(0) and u(i) = us(i) − uns(i), i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 in the
dynamics of (3.1) ensures y(k) = 0, thus achieving output controllability of the state
x(0) = xs(0)− xns(0).
Theorem 3.23. Let (3.1) be output controllable in k steps for a set of states Xoc(0)\
{0} and controls {U(·)}. Let X1 and X2 be sets such that every x1 ∈ X1 can be
written as x+ x2, where x ∈ Xoc(0) \ {0} and x2 ∈ X2. Then, X1 is strongly k-ISO
with respect to X2.
Proof. Output controllability ensures that:
y(k) = CAkx(0) +
k−1∑
j=0
CAk−j−1BU(j) = 0 (3.4)














Using the assumption that every x1 ∈ X1 can be written as x + x2, where x ∈
Xoc(0) \ {0}, x2 ∈ X2, and Equation (3.4), we get y1(k) = y2(k).
Thus, for any x1 ∈ X1 and any control sequence starting from x1, there exist
x2 ∈ X2 and another control sequence such that the outputs after k steps are the
same. This is strong k-ISO with Xs = X1 and Xns = X2.
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3.5 ε-Opacity
The condition that the output at times k ∈ K starting from every state in Xs
be equal to the output obtained by starting from some state in Xns is quite strong.
In this section, we postulate that (a form of) opacity will still hold if the outputs
differ by a predefined amount. We only consider the single adversary case; the
material can be easily extended to the decentralized notions of opacity in Sections
4.2 and 4.4. Defining ε−opacity for the case in Section 4.3 will require more careful
consideration.
Definition 3.24. For system (3.1), given Xs, Xns ⊆ X0, k ∈ K, and ε ≥ 0, Xs is
strongly ε−k-ISO with respect to Xns if for all xs(0) ∈ Xs and for every sequence of
admissible controls us(0), . . . , us(k− 1), there exist an xns(0) ∈ Xns, and a sequence
of admissible controls uns(0), . . . , uns(k − 1) such that ‖ys(k)− yns(k)‖2 ≤ ε.
Xs is strongly ε−K-ISO with respect to Xns if it is strongly ε− k-ISO for all
k ∈ K.
A couple of remarks are in order before we present the main result of this
section. Notice that ε = 0 corresponds to the definition of strong k-ISO seen earlier.
Moreover, we can derive conditions that establish ε−opacity in terms of sets of
reachable states.
Let z be a point, and S be a set. Then, the distance of z from S is defined as
dist(z, S) := inf{dist(z, s)|s ∈ S}.
Theorem 3.25. The following hold:
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Figure 3.3: Representation of ε− k-ISO
1. Xs is strongly ε− k-ISO with respect to Xns if and only if :
max
z∈CXs(k)
dist(z, CXns(k)) ≤ ε (3.5)
That is, the farthest a point in CXs(k) can be from CXns(k) is ε.
2. Xs is strongly ε−K-ISO with respect to Xns if and only if (3.5) holds for all
k ∈ K.
Proof. The proof of this result follows from the definition of ε−k-ISO and Theorem
3.4.
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Chapter 4: Opacity for Linear Systems: The Multiple Adversaries
Case
In this chapter, we extend the framework for opacity presented in the previous
chapter to the case when there is more than one adversarial observer, and define
several notions of decentralized opacity. These notions of decentralized opacity will
depend on whether there is a centralized coordinator or not, and the presence or
absence of collusion among the adversaries. We establish conditions for decentralized
opacity in terms of sets of reachable states. In the case of colluding adversaries, we
derive a condition for nonopacity in terms of the structure of the communication
graph.
Section 4.1 presents the system model. Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 defines and
characterizes the three notions of decentralized opacity.
4.1 System Model
The system model is identical to that considered in the previous chapter,
except that there are multiple adversaries, each seeing an output corresponding to
its observation map Ci. As in the single adversary case, every adversary is assumed
to have knowledge of the initial sets of secret and nonsecret states, Xs and Xns,
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the system model (A,B), and its own observation map Ci, and is assumed to have
unlimited computing power.
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t)
x(0) = x0 ∈ X0
yi(t) = Cix(t); i = 1, 2, . . . , l (4.1)
where x ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rm, yi ∈ Rpi , and A,B,Ci are matrices of appropriate dimensions
containing real entries. In the sequel, we will assume that all of the adversaries
observe the system at the same time instants in the set K.
The presence or absence of coordination among the adversaries, and the pres-
ence or absence of a coordinator that aggregates information based on the adver-
saries’ observations, is the distinguishing feature, and a definition of decentralized
opacity is proposed in each case.
4.2 No Coordinator, No Coordination
The agents are assumed to not communicate with each other, and there is no
centralized coordinator. Opacity of the secret will be achieved when it is simulta-
neously opaque with respect to every adversary.
Definition 4.1. For system (4.1), given Xs, Xns ⊆ X0 and k ∈ K, Xs is strongly
decentralized k−ISO with respect to Xns if for all xs(0) ∈ Xs and for every sequence
of admissible controls us(0), . . . , us(k − 1), there exist an xns(0) ∈ Xns, and a se-
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quence of admissible controls uns(0), . . . , uns(k− 1) such that ysi(k) = ynsi(k) for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}.
Xs is strongly decentralized K−ISO with respect to Xns if it is strongly decen-
tralized k−ISO for all k ∈ K.
As in the single adversary case, we have a necesary and sufficient condition for
for decentralized opacity in terms of sets of reachable states in k steps.
Theorem 4.2. The following hold:
1. Xs is strongly decentralized k−ISO with respect to Xns if and only if CiXs(k) ⊆
CiXns(k) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}.
2. Xs is strongly decentralized K−ISO with respect to Xns if and only if CiXs(k) ⊆
CiXns(k) for all k ∈ K, and for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}.
Proof. The proof of this result follows by applying Theorem 3.4 to every adversary
i = {1, 2, . . . , l}.
The following result explores the relationship between decentralized k−ISO for
a set of adversaries and k−ISO for a single adversary with an aggregated observation
map.
Proposition 4.3. Xs is strongly decentralized k−ISO with respect to Xns and adver-
saries with observation maps C1, . . . , Cl if Xs is strongly k−ISO with respect to Xns









Proof. Xs strongly k−ISO with respect to Xns is equivalent to C̄Xs(k) ⊆ C̄Xns(k).
This means that for every xs(k) ∈ Xs(k), there exists an xns(k) ∈ Xns(k) such that
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C1xs(k) = C1xns(k), . . . , Clxs(k) = Clxns(k). Thus, we have CiXs(k) ⊆ CiXns(k)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, which is equivalent to Xs being strongly decentralized k−ISO
with respect to Xns.
It is to be noted that strong decentralized k−ISO need not necessarily ensure
strong k−ISO with respect to an adversary with the aggregated observation map
since, the nonsecret states in Xns(k) and the corresponding control sequences for
each adversary might be different.
4.3 With Coordinator, No Coordination
Here, we assume that there is a coordinator, whose role is to poll the obser-
vations of each adversary, and decide on co-opacity according to some (predefined)
rule. The coordinator does not have knowledge of the system model or the adver-
saries’ observation maps. In fact, our model is such that the coordinator cannot do
any better even if it knows the system model or the observation maps. It can be
viewed as an agent whose role is to ensure that the whole is greater than the sum
of its parts.
Formally, the coordinator communicates to the adversaries the time instants
K, at which the system needs to be observed. At each k ∈ K, agent i observes
yi(k) = Cix(k). The agents communicate φi(yi(k)) to the coordinator, where φi :
Rpi → 2Rn×Rn is defined as:




Figure 4.1: Coordinated Decentralized Opacity
Thus, φi(·) returns secret-nonsecret state pairs that give the same output yi(k)
at time k.
The coordinator then computes a function Ψ(k) := Ψ(φ1(y1(k)), . . . , φl(yl(k))),
where Ψ : (2R
n×Rn)l → 2Rn×Rn . Thus, the coordinator plays the role of gathering the
outputs of the observations of each adversary, and composing them to then decide
on opacity. An example of a valid coordinator function is Ψ(k) =
⋃
i(φi(Cix(k))).
The scheme is shown in Figure (4.1) for the case of four adversaries.
Definition 4.4. For system (4.1), given Xs, Xns ⊆ X0 and k ∈ K, Xs is strongly
co-k−ISO with respect to Xns and Ψ if for all xs(0) ∈ Xs and for every sequence of
admissible controls us(0), . . . , us(k− 1), there exist an xns(0) ∈ Xns, and a sequence
of admissible controls uns(0), . . . , uns(k − 1) such that Ψ(k) is nonempty.
Xs is strongly co-K−ISO with respect to Xns and Ψ if it is strongly co-k−ISO
for all k ∈ K.
Before presenting the main result of this section, we provide an alternative
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characterization of strong k−ISO in terms of the map φ (the subscript on φi is
dropped since we consider only a single adversary in this case). Further, it is im-
portant to note that the functions φi and Ψ return a set of pairs of states at time
k. This information will need to be used to determine opacity of the initial set of
secret states with respect to the initial set of nonsecret states.
We extend the definition of φ to sets of outputs at time k. Let φ(CX(k)) :=⋃
{φ(y(k)) : [y(k) = Cx(k)] ∧ [x(k) ∈ X(k)]}. For (x1i , x2j) ∈ Xs(k) × Xns(k), in
a slight abuse of notation, we treat each x1i and x
2





























ns(k) := {x ∈ Xns(k) : Cx ∈ CXs(k)}.
Proof. Let strong k−ISO hold. Then, CXs(k) ⊆ CXns(k) (Theorem 3.4), and




ns(k) is as defined above.
If φ(CXs(k)) = (Xs(k), X
′
ns(k)), then ∀x1 ∈ Xs(k), ∃x2 ∈ X ′ns(k) ⊆ Xns(k)
such that Cx1(k) = Cx2(k). This gives CXs(k) ⊆ CXns(k), which implies strong
k−ISO (Theorem 3.4).
The above result says that strong k−ISO holds if and only if the first compo-
nent of φ(·) when acting on the set of secret outputs at time k is the entire set of
reachable states at time k, starting from Xs. Further, it also determines the states
in Xns(k) that ensure strong k−ISO.
Theorem 4.6. Xs is strongly co-k−ISO with respect to Xns and Ψ if and only if






Proof. The proof of this result follows from the previous result, and the definition
of co−k−ISO. The major difference is that in this case, the first component of
φi(CiXs(k)) can be a subset of Xs(k). However, the coordinator function Ψ must
be such that its first component is Xs(k).
Thus, Xs can be strongly co−k−ISO with respect to Xns though strong k−ISO
might not hold for any single adversary.
4.4 No Coordinator, With Coordination
In this case, there is no coordinator, but the adversaries are assumed to com-
municate among themselves. The communication structure is represented by a di-
rected graph G, whose vertices are the adversaries, and G has an edge directed from
i to j if adversary j can receive information from adversary i. The goal of the ad-
versaries is to ensure, using the coordination structure, that Xs is not k−ISO with
respect to Xns for each of them. To this end, we introduce the following definitions:
Definition 4.7. For the system (4.1), given Xs, Xns ⊆ X0 and k ∈ K, Xs is
strongly not k−ISO with respect to Xns if Xs is not strongly k−ISO with respect to
Xns for every adversary.
Definition 4.8. Given a graph G = (V , E), where V are the vertices of the graph
and E ⊂ V × V are edges, D ⊂ V is a dominating set if every vertex not in D has
a neighbor in D.
Given a directed graph G = (V , E), D ⊂ V is a directed dominating set(red
vertices in figure (4.2)) if every vertex not in D has an incoming edge from some
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Figure 4.2: Vertices in red form a directed dominating set
vertex in D, that is, [∀u ∈ V \D, ∃v ∈ D such that (v → u) ∈ E ].
At each k ∈ K, each adversary observes y(k), determines if k−ISO holds or
not, and communicates (Ci, < k−ISO status>i) to its neighbors in G. If < k−ISO
status>i= 0, i.e. k−ISO does not hold for adversary i, then a neighbor j of i in
G adopts Ci as its observation map if < k−ISO status>j 6= 0. This scheme can be
interpreted as a dynamic version of k−ISO, in which the adversaries change their
observation maps at times k ∈ K depending on the k−ISO status of their neigh-
bors in G. A key assumption here is that the time required for the adversaries to
communicate amongst themselves is much less than the time scale of the system.
The following result provides a means to achieve strong non-opacity without requir-
ing non-opacity with respect to every adversary using the communication scheme
described above.
Theorem 4.9. For the system (4.1), Xs is strongly not k−ISO with respect to Xns
if the set of adversaries for which Xs is not strongly k−ISO with respect to Xns is
a directed dominating set of G.
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Proof. Each adversary communicates (Ci, < k−ISO status>i) to its neighbors in
G. Thus, if k−ISO does not hold for some adversary i, then its neighbors will also
adopt the same Ci matrix at time k. The result then follows from the definition of
a directed dominating set.
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Chapter 5: Opacity for Switched Linear Systems
In this chapter, we formulate notions of opacity for CPSs modeled as discrete-
time switched linear systems (DT-SLSs). An SLS consists of a finite number of lin-
ear subsystems (called modes) and a rule that governs the switching among them.
Many practical systems can be modeled as operating in one of several modes, often
switching from one mode of operation to another. Further, it has been shown that
switching control strategies can achieve better control performance than nonswitch-
ing strategies. The reader is referred to [43], [44], [45] for an introduction to the
design and control of switched systems. We will assume that each subsystem is
governed by linear, time-invariant dynamics.
We present the model of the system that will be studied in this chapter and
underlying assumptions in Section 5.1. Sections 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 present the main
results of the chapter, wherein we formulate several notions of opacity for SLSs.
We distinguish between the cases when the secret is specified as an initial mode,
an initial state, or a combination of the two, and whether the adversary observes
a mode, a function of the state, or a combination of the two. In each case, we
present conditions that will establish that notion of opacity. We place constraints
on the modes that the system will be allowed to transition into from a given mode
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and impose bounds on the dwell times in each mode. Moreover, we constrain the
number of changes of modes before the adversary can make its observation in our
definitions of opacity for SLSs. Algorithmic procedures to verify these notions of
opacity are given in Section 5.5, where we also provide conservative upper bounds
on their computational complexity. Illustrative examples are presented in Section
5.6.
5.1 System Model and Assumptions
Consider a DT-SLS is of the form:
x(t+ 1) = A(Mt)x(t) +B(Mt)u(t) (5.1)
x(0) = x0 ∈ X0
y(t) = Cx(t) (5.2)
where x ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rm, y ∈ Rp, and A(·), B(·), C are matrices of appropriate
dimensions containing real entries. Mt ∈ {1, 2, . . . , z} denotes the mode active at
time t. The solution to the state Equation (5.1) is given by Equation (5.3) (in
Section 5.3). The system switches from a mode M′ to M′′ at a time t = ts, which
is called a switching time. That is, A(Mts−1) = A(M′), while A(Mts) = A(M′′).
The B(·) matrix switches similarly. A switching sequence of length N is a collection
of N (possibly nonconsecutive) switching times ts1 < ts2 < · · · < tsN . Let K be a
set of positive integers corresponding to the instants of time the adversary makes
an observation of the system. The subscript s (ns), when appended to the states,
inputs, and outputs, will correspond to trajectories that start from the set of initial
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secret (nonsecret) states.
The following assumptions will be needed to formalize notions of opacity for
SLSs in this chapter.
Assumption 5.1. The allowed transitions between modes is specified by a directed
graph G = (V , E) whose vertices are the modes {1, . . . , z} and edges are the possible
transitions between modes.
Assumption 5.2. The mode changes at every switching time ts.
Assumption 5.3. The switching sequence does not depend on initial states and
controls1.
Assumption 5.4. ( Nonblocking Property) It is possible for the system to switch
to at least one other mode from every mode.
Assumption 5.5. ( Dwell constraints) The system is allowed to remain in a mode
a for a duration of time τad ∈ [τadmin , τ
a
dmin




Assumption 5.6. The adversary has knowledge of the initial secret and nonsecret
specifications – sets of states and/ or modes, as the case may be – the A(·), B(·)
matrices, the observation map C, the graph G, and the minimum and maximum
dwell times in each mode.
A path in G is an alternating sequence of vertices and edges of G, v0e1v1e2 . . . .
A path will always begin and end in a vertex of G. Further, if the sequence vi−1eivi
1A standard assumption in the SLS literature is that there is only a finite number of switches
in any finite time interval. This is needed to rule out the Zeno phenomenon in continuous time
systems. It will not be needed here since we are dealing with discrete time systems.
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appears in a path, then vi−1 and vi are respectively the source and target vertices of
edge ei in G. The length of a path is defined to be the number of vertices in the path.
Let Θ[N ] be the set of paths of length N + 1 in G. This corresponds to N changes
of modes. Knowledge of G will help eliminate transitions that are impossible. An
element θ ∈ Θ[N ] can be written as v0e1v1e2 . . . eNvN , with vi 6= vi+1 (Assumption
5.2). We will represent θ ∈ Θ[N ] as a sequence of vertices v0v1 . . . vN when the edges
representing transitions between vertices are obvious.
Assumption 5.7. At a time k ∈ K, the number of switches of modes, q, is strictly
less than k.
Assumption 5.8. For given q and k, tsq < k. That is, the q mode changes occur
before time k. Further, if k is a possible ((q + 1)st) switching time, and if the
adversary is observing the mode of the system, its observation will be Mk−, that is,
the mode the system is in just before the switching at time k2.
The notions of opacity developed in this chapter will be defined in terms of q
and k. Informally, for a given number of mode changes q, the secret is said to be
opaque at a time k if for every ‘allowed’ switching sequence of length q starting from
the secret modes and/ or states, there is an ‘allowed’ switching sequence of length
q starting from a nonsecret mode and/ or state, such that the observation at time
k will be indistinguishable to the adversary. The ‘allowed’ switching sequences will
be those that respect the dwell time constraints in the modes along paths of length
2This assumption is needed because the state, and consequently, the output of the system at a
time t depends only on the modes of the system upto time t− 1.
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q+ 1. Throughout this paper, a switching sequence of length q will correspond to a
path of length q + 1 in G.
5.2 Initial Mode Opacity
In this case, the secret is specified as a set of modes. LetMs ⊂ {1, . . . , z} and
Mns ⊂ {1, . . . , z} be the sets of initial secret and nonsecret modes, withMs∩Mns =
∅. The mode at time t, starting from a mode inMs (Mns) at time 0 will be denoted
Mst (Mnst ). The adversary observes the mode of the system at a time k ∈ K. Its goal
is to use this observation and other information that it has access to (Assumption
5.6) to deduce if the system started from a secret mode.
Definition 5.9. Given Ms,Mns, k ∈ K, and q < k, Ms is (k, q)-initial mode
opaque ((k, q)-IMO) with respect to Mns if for all θ = v0 . . . vq ∈ Θ[q] satisfying
v0 ∈ Ms and
∑
θ τd = k, there exists θ
′ = v′0 . . . v
′
q ∈ Θ[q] that satisfies v′0 ∈ Mns
and
∑
θ′ τd = k, such that Msk =Mnsk .
The term
∑
θ τd = k means that there exists a sequence of q + 1 dwell times






]}, j = 0, . . . , (q − 1), and 1 ≤ τ vqd ≤ τ
vq
dmax
along the path θ =






d = k. Thus, we only consider paths of length q+ 1
in G for which the dwell times in modes along the path are ‘sufficiently long’.










Proof. ⇒: Follows from Definition 5.9.
⇐: Every mode the system can reach at time k starting from a secret mode
at time 0 after q mode changes and respecting dwell time constraints along the path
can also be reached by starting from a nonsecret mode at time 0, and an allowed
switching sequence of length q. This establishes Definition 5.9.
It is important that the system dwell in a mode for sufficiently long in order
to meaningfully establish initial mode opacity.
Proposition 5.11. If τadmax = 1 for every mode a ∈ {1, . . . , z}, then for any choice
of Ms and Mns, and for every q < k − 1, Ms will not be (k, q)-IMO w.r.t. Mns.
The main result of this section provides guarantees on (k′, q′)-IMO for k′ >
k, q′ > q if it has been established that (k, q)-IMO holds. In the sequel, we will
write
∑
q τd to denote the sum of the dwell times in the modes along a path of length
q + 1 in the directed graph.
Theorem 5.12. If Ms is (k, q)-IMO with respect to Mns, then for every Q > 0,
Ms is (k +K, q +Q)-IMO w.r.t. Mns for all K ∈ [
∑








Proof. Let Θ[q,Q] denote the set of valid extensions of length Q to a switching se-
quence of length q. Then, every θ′′ ∈ Θ[q+Q] can be written as θ.θe, where θ ∈ Θ[q]
and θe ∈ Θ[q,Q], and . denotes the concatenation of the paths. (k, q)-IMO ensures
that for every θ ∈ Θ[q] starting from a secret mode and satisfying the dwell time
constraints along the path, there exists θ′ ∈ Θ[q] starting from a nonsecret mode
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and satisfying the dwell time constraints along θ′, such that Msk = Mnsk . Using
Assumption 5.4, any extension of θ (θ′) of length Q can be written as α = θ.θe
(α′ = θ′.θe), where θe ∈ Θ[q,Q]. This shows that (k +K, q +Q)-IMO holds for some
K ≥ Q.
The lower and upper bounds on K are obtained by considering the minimum
and maximum dwell times along the extension of length Q to a path of length q,
and noting that τadmin ≥ 1 for every mode (Assumption 5.5). Two cases need to be
considered:




d ) ≥ τ
vq
dmin
. In this case, the term
∑










d ) < τ
vq
dmin








. Thus, we have K ∈ [
∑








This formulation of (k, q)-IMO is reminiscent of ‘state-based’ notions of DES
opacity [23]. However, unlike in the DES case, we do not insist that the entire
secret trace be indistinguishable from the entire nonsecret trace; we require indis-
tinguishability only at time k, with the caveat that there be only q changes of modes.
(k, q)-IMO does not depend on the dynamics within each mode.
5.3 Initial Mode and State Opacity
In this case, the adversary observes y(k) and Mk at a time k ∈ K. This
formulation is similar in flavor to pathwise observability (PWO) in [54]. However,
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x(t+1) = A(Mt) . . . A(M0)x(0)+
t−1∑
j=0




















{x : x(i+1) = A(Mi)x(i)+B(Mi)u(i),∀i < k}
(5.5)
in their framework, the entire mode sequence and the output up to time k are
available. Here, we only have snapshots of the output-mode pair at a time k ∈ K.
The secret in this case is specified as a state-mode pair.
Definition 5.13. For the system 5.2, given k ∈ K, q < k, X̄s := (Xs;Ms), and
X̄ns := (Xns;Mns), with Xs, Xns ⊂ X0, X̄s is (k, q)-initial mode and state
opaque ((k, q)-IMSO) with respect to X̄ns if for every xs(0) ∈ Xs, every sequence
of admissible controls Uks , and every θ = v0 . . . vq ∈ Θ[q] satisfying v0 ∈ Ms and∑
θ τd = k, there exist an xns(0) ∈ Xns, a sequence of admissible controls Ukns, and
θ′ = v′0 . . . v
′
q ∈ Θ[q], satisfying v′0 ∈ Mns and
∑
θ′ τd = k such that: i)Msk = Mnsk ,
and ii)ys(k) = yns(k).
That is, corresponding to every allowed switching sequence of length q starting
from a secret mode and every valid control sequence of length k starting from a secret
state, there is an allowed switching sequence of length q starting from a nonsecret
mode, and a valid control sequence of length k starting from a nonsecret mode, such
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that the mode and the output at time k will be indistinguishable to the adversary.
The set of reachable states at time k with q mode changes, starting from X̄s
(X̄ns), and applying k admissible controls and respecting the dwell constraints of
the modes is given by Equation (5.4) (Equation (5.5)).










ii) CXs(k, q) ⊆ CXns(k, q).
Proof. ⇒: From the definition of (k, q)-IMSO, i) holds. Xs(k, q) (Xns(k, q)) is the
set of states reachable at time k starting from states in Xs (Xns) and modes in
Ms (Mns), performing q changes of modes along the way, while respecting dwell
constraints of each mode. Therefore, for each x′ ∈ Xs(k, q), there exists x′′ ∈
Xns(k, q) such that ys(k) = Cx
′ = Cx′′ = yns(k). This gives ii).
⇐: i) ensures that for every allowed switching sequence of length q starting
from Ms, there exists an allowed switching sequence starting from Mns such that
the mode at time k is indistinguishable. ii) ensures that for every x′ ∈ Xs(k, q), there
exists an x′′ ∈ Xns(k, q) such that ys(k) = Cx′ = Cx′′ = yns(k). From Equation
(5.4) ((5.5)), x′ (x′′) is a state got by starting from an initial secret state and secret
mode (nonsecret initial state and nonsecret mode), while satisfying dwell constraints
and number of allowed changes of mode. This proves (k, q)-IMSO.
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5.4 Opacity for Unobserved Modes
In this case, the adversary observes the output y(k) at a time k ∈ K, and using
only this information, it needs to determine if the system started from a secret state
or mode. We consider two possible scenarios: when the secret is specified as a set
of initial modes, and when the secret is specified as a set of initial states. This
is like the unobservable mode case considered in [54], where they separately study
the possibilities of recovering only the mode or only the state, after observing (at
each time instant) the output. These notions are more general than (k, q)-IMSO in
the sense that there is no constraint that the system start from a particular mode
(Section 5.4.1) or a particular state (Section 5.4.2). Moreover, the modes at time
k corresponding to the secret and nonsecret trajectories need not be the same. The
subscript M will serve to indicate that the modes remain unobserved.
5.4.1 Initial Mode Opacity
The secret is specified as a set of modes, and the adversary has to deduce if
the system started from a secret mode based on observing y(k) at a time k ∈ K.
Definition 5.15. For system 5.2, given X0,Ms,Mns, k ∈ K, and q < k, Ms is
(k, q)M-initial mode opaque ((k, q)M-IMO) with respect to Mns if for every
initial state, every sequence of admissible controls, and every θ = v0 . . . vq ∈ Θ[q]
satisfying v0 ∈Ms and
∑
θ τd = k, there exist an initial state, a sequence of admis-
sible controls, and a θ′ = v′0 . . . v
′
q ∈ Θ[q] that satisfies v′0 ∈ Mns and
∑
θ′ τd = k,
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such that ys(k) = yns(k).
Let X ′s(k, q) (X
′
ns(k, q)) denote the set of states reachable at time k after q
changes of modes starting from a secret mode (nonsecret mode) at time 0. That is,
the condition x0 ∈ Xs (x0 ∈ Xns) in Equation (5.4) ((5.5)) is replaced by x0 ∈ X0,
and the subscript on Uks (U
k
ns) is dropped.
Theorem 5.16. Ms is (k, q)M-IMO with respect toMns if and only if CX ′s(k, q) ⊆
CX ′ns(k, q).
Proof. ⇒: X ′s(k, q) (X ′ns(k, q)) is the set of states reachable at time k starting
from modes in Ms (Mns), performing q changes of modes along the way, while
respecting dwell constraints of each mode. Therefore, for each x′ ∈ X ′s(k, q), there
exists x′′ ∈ X ′ns(k, q) such that ys(k) = Cx′ = Cx′′ = yns(k). This gives CX ′s(k, q) ⊆
CX ′ns(k, q).
⇐: Corresponding to every x′ ∈ X ′s(k, q), there exists an x′′ ∈ X ′ns(k, q) such
that ys(k) = Cx
′ = Cx′′ = yns(k). x
′ (x′′), by definition, is a state that is got by
starting from a secret mode (nonsecret mode), while satisfying dwell constraints and
number of allowed changes of modes. Therefore, for every initial state starting from
a secret mode and every allowed switching sequence of length q, there is an initial
state starting from a nonsecret mode and a switching sequence of length q such that
the outputs at time k are indistinguishable. This gives (k, q)M-IMO.
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5.4.2 Initial State Opacity
The adversary has to determine if the system started from a secret state, based
on its observation y(k) at time k ∈ K. The underlying idea behind this notion is
similar to k-ISO (Definition 3.1), with the difference that the system switches among
several modes.
Definition 5.17. For the system 5.2, given Xs, Xns ⊂ X0, k ∈ K, and q < k, Xs
is (k, q)M-initial state opaque ((k, q)M-ISO) with respect to Xns if for every
xs(0) ∈ Xs, every sequence of admissible controls Uks , and every θ ∈ Θ[q] satisfying∑
θ τd = k, there exist an xns(0) ∈ Xns, a sequence of admissible controls Ukns, and
a θ′ ∈ Θ[q], satisfying
∑
θ′ τd = k such that ys(k) = yns(k).
Let X ′′s (k, q) (X
′′
ns(k, q)) denote the set of states reachable at time k after q
changes of modes starting from Xs (Xns) at time 0, without restrictions on the initial
modes. That is, the condition v0 ∈Ms (v0 ∈Mns) is removed from Equation (5.4)
(Equation (5.5)).
Theorem 5.18. Xs is (k, q)M-ISO with respect to Xns if and only if CX
′′
s (k, q) ⊆
CX ′′ns(k, q).
The proof of this result is similar to Theorems 5.14 and 5.16, and is omitted.
5.5 Computational Complexity
This section presents procedures to verify (k, q)-IMO and (k, q)-IMSO. Algo-
rithm 1 depends on determining paths of length q+ 1 in G, and determining a set of
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q+ 1 numbers that sum to k. Algorithm 2 depends on determining sets of reachable
states, and Algorithm 1.
The SUBSETSUM problem asks the following question: given a set of non-
negative integers S and a target number t, is there a subset of S whose elements
sum to t? This problem is known to be NP-Complete [55]3. The rSUM problem
asks: given a set of nonnegative integers S and numbers r and t, is there is a subset
of S of size r whose elements sum to t? The brute-force algorithm for rSUM runs
in time O(|S|r). More recent results have significantly lowered this bound [56].
In our setting, given a set of q + 1 lists Li := [τ
i
dmin




{1, 2, . . . , q + 1}, we ask if there is an assignment of nonzero numbers τ1, . . . , τq+1,
with τi ∈ Li such that
∑
i τi = k. This is equivalent to the rSUM problem, with
r = q+ 14. Let Csum denote the number of operations needed to solve this problem.
Given the adjacency matrix A of G 5, the ij entry of Aq gives the number of
paths in Θ[q] with v0 = i and vq = j. Let Cpow denote the complexity of computing
Aq. This typically takes O(zωlog q) operations, where z is the number of vertices of
G (modes of the system), and zω (ω < 3) is the complexity of matrix multiplication.
Let Cpath be the maximum number of operations needed to determine a path of
length q in G. This problem is trivially solvable in O(zq), but can be more efficient,
3A decision problem is in class NP if all instances of the problem to which the answer is ‘yes’
can be efficiently verified by a deterministic Turing machine. It is NP-complete if, additionally, it
is as hard as any problem in NP.
4An additional requirement is that the lists be of equal sizes. This can be achieved by padding
them with zeros.
5Aij = 1 if there is an edge in G from vi to vj , and Aij = 0 otherwise.
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depending on the structure G. Let bi :=
∑
j[Aq]ij denote the total number of paths
in Θ[q] from vertex i. Then, the number of operations to determine all θ ∈ Θ[q]
such that v0 = i is at most biCpath. Let b :=
∑
i bi; i ∈ (Ms
⋃
Mns). Algorithm
2 invokes Algorithm 1, and further, computes sets of states that are reachable at
time k after q mode changes. Let Creach denote the complexity of computing the
sets of reachable states. Under reasonable assumptions on the structures of the
sets of controls and initial states, approximations of sets of reachable states can
be calculated with arbitrary precision using procedures that are linear in the time
horizon(k) and polynomial in the dimension of the state space(n) ( [57], [58], [59]).
Let Cmult denote the complexity of the matrix-vector multiplication Cx, x ∈ X(·, ·).
This typically takes O(pn) operations.
Proposition 5.19. 1. Calg1 ≤ k1bCpath + k2Csum + k3Cpow;
2. Calg2 ≤ k′1Calg1 + k′2Creach + k′3Cmult for constants k1, k2, k3, k′1, k′2, k′3 > 0.
5.6 Examples
Example 5.20. Figure 5.1 shows the allowed mode transitions in a switched system
with five modes and the minimum and maximum dwell times in each mode. Notice
that the system is nonblocking. Let Ms = {1} and Mns = {3, 5}. Let q = 2. Then,
Θ[2] ⊃ {(1, 2, 3), (1, 2, 4), (1, 5, 2), (3, 5, 2), (5, 2, 3), (5, 2, 4)} (only considering paths
starting from Ms or Mns). For k = 6, Ms is (6, 2)-IMO w.r.t. Mns, since for
all paths in Figure 5.1 of length q + 1 = 3 starting from mode 1 such that the dwell
times in the modes along the path sum to 6, there is a corresponding path of length
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Algorithm 1 Verifying (k, q)-IMO
Input: Ms,Mns, k, q, [τadmin , τ
a
dmax
] for each mode a, G = (V , E) specifying allowed
mode transitions.
Output: YES, if Ms is (k, q)-IMO w.r.t. Mns; NO, if not.
1: Msk =Mnsk = ∅
2: ΘM
s
[q] := {v0e1 . . . vq ∈ G: v0 ∈Ms}
3: ΘM
ns
[q] := {v0e1 . . . vq ∈ G: v0 ∈Mns}
4: for each θ ∈ ΘMs[q] do
5: if (
∑






9: for each θ′ ∈ ΘMns[q] do
10: if (
∑′












Algorithm 2 Verifying (k, q)-IMSO





Output: YES, if X̄s is (k, q)-IMSO w.r.t. X̄ns; NO, if not.
1: ANS ← Result of Algorithm 1
2: if ANS == Y ES then
3: Compute Xs(k, q) using Equation (5.4)
4: Compute Xns(k, q) using Equation (5.5)
5: if CXs(k, q) ⊆ CXns(k, q) then


















Figure 5.1: Switched system considered in Example 5.20
3 starting from modes 3 or 5 also satisfying the dwell constraints along the path,
such that Ms6 = Mns6 . However, Ms is not (3, 2)-IMO w.r.t. Mns. Consider the
path (1, 2, 3) starting from Ms with τ 1d = 1, τ 2d = 1, τ 3d = 1. There does not exist a
corresponding path starting from Mns such that Mns3 = 3.
Example 5.21. Consider the system in Figure 5.1, with the following additional
specifications:





























d = 4 M0M1M2M3
1 2 2, 2 1 1 2 2
1 2 3, 1 1 1 1 2
5 2 2, 2 5 5 2 2
1 5 2, 2 1 1 5 5
1 5 3, 1 1 1 1 5
3 5 2, 2 1 1 5 5
3 5 3, 1 3 3 3 5



















. For q = 1 and k = 4, the set of switching sequences
of length 1 starting from Ms or Mns, the dwell times along the path that sum to
k, and the modes of the system is given in table 5.1. The output at time 4 for an
initial state x(0) and controls u(0), u(1), u(2), u(3) for each of the mode sequences





x(0) + 2u(0) + 2u(1) + 2u(2) + 2u(3)
From Table 5.1, it is evident that for every initial secret mode, there is an initial
nonsecret mode such that Ms4 = Mns4 . Further, in the cases when k = 4 hap-





∈ Xns. Then, for ys(4) = yns(4), the following con-
dition will have to be satisfied: for every us(0), us(1), us(2), us(3), there must exist
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If the controls are allowed to take arbitrary values in R, then X̄s will be (4, 1)-IMSO




: xi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, 3}
and 0 ≤ us(j) ≤ p1, 0 ≤ uns(j) ≤ p2 for j = 0, 1, 2, 3, and p1 > p2, then X̄s will not
be (4, 1)-IMSO w.r.t. X̄ns.
Example 5.22. Consider the system in Figure 5.1, with the following additional
specifications [60]:
A(1) = A(2) =
18 −4
25 −10




















: x1 = −1}; 1
)
, X̄ns = (Xns;Mns) :=(
R3 \Xs; 3, 5
)
, and C = I2×2. For q = 1 and k = 3, the set of switching sequences of
length 1 starting fromMs orMns, the dwell times along the path that sum to k, and
the modes of the system is given in Table 5.2. If the controls are restricted in the
following way: (2us(0), us(1), us(2)) = (uns(0), uns(1), uns(2)) = (u0, u1, u2), where









. However, x′(0) /∈ Xns (in fact, x′(0) ∈ Xs), which means
that X̄s is not (3, 1)-IMSO w.r.t. X̄ns.
Example 5.23. Consider the system in Figure 5.1 with A(·), B(·), C matrices as








and Xns = R3 \
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d = 3 M0M1M2M3
1 2 (1, 2) 1 2 2 3
1 2 (2, 1) 1 1 2 3
1 2 (2, 1) 1 1 2 2
5 2 (2, 1) 5 5 2 3
5 2 (2, 1) 5 5 2 2
1 5 (1, 2) 1 5 5 2
1 5 (2, 1) 1 1 5 5
3 5 (2, 1) 3 3 5 5
Xs. The output at time 4 for any allowed switching sequence of length 1 has the
same form as in example 5.21. If the control can take any value in R, Xs will be
(4, 1)M-ISO with respect to Xns.
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Chapter 6: A Structured Systems Approach to Resilience to Denial-
of-Service Attacks
This chapter presents a characterization of the resilience of a cyberphysical
system (CPS) modeled as a linear structured system to denial-of-service (DoS) at-
tacks. The resilience of the system to an attack is interpreted in terms of unmatched
vertices in maximum matchings of bipartie graph, and connected components of
directed graph representations of the system under attack. We further go on to
establish conditions under which a system will be structurally resilient to a state
feedback integrity attack if it is already structurally resilient to a DoS attack. We
conclude the chapter by proposing a characterization of structural resilience for
switched structured systems.
The problem to be solved is stated in Section 6.1, and Section 6.2 summarizes
some of the results on structural controllability from the literature. The main results
of the chapter are presented in Sections 6.3 and 6.4. The computational complexity
of the results presented in this chapter only rely on determining maximum matchings
in bipartite graphs and strongly connected components of directed graphs. Section
6.5 makes a note of this. Section 6.6 presents several examples to illustrate our
results. We extend our work to characterize the structural resilience of switched
74
linear systems to DoS attacks in Section 6.7.
6.1 Problem Formulation
Consider the linear structured system
ẋ(t) = [A]x(t) + [B]u(t) (6.1)
where, x(t) ∈ Rn, u(t) ∈ Rp, [A] ∈ {0, ∗}n×n and [B] ∈ {0, ∗}n×p.
Removing the explicit dependence on t, and rewriting u(t) in Equation (6.1)
as u =
(
u1 . . . ud ud+1 . . . up
)T
, we will use udef ∈ Rd and uatt ∈ Ra (with
a := p−d) to collectively denote the elements
(




ud+1 . . . up
)T
respectively. The sets udef and uatt represent the input vertices accessible to the
system (defender) and attacker respectively. The structural resilience of the system
to the different types of attacks discussed in this chapter will depend, to a large
extent, on the cardinality of the vertex sets udef and uatt (that is, on d and a)
vis-à-vis the number of unmatched state vertices.
The system model is now:
ẋ(t) = [A]x(t) + [Bdef ]udef (t) + [Batt]uatt(t) (6.2)
Assumption 6.1. The sets of state vertices that can be directly connected to inputs
controlled by the defender and attacker are disjoint. Let Xdef and Xatt denote these
sets. That is, the inputs in udef can only be connected to state vertices in Xdef and
inputs in uatt can only be connected to state vertices in Xatt.
This is a reasonable assumption in that it means that the defender (system)
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will have limited or restricted access to only a subset of the state vertices which it
can ‘directly’ control (Xdef ) in order to be resilient to an attack. Further, once the
attacker has gained access to the system by manipulating a subset of the inputs,
thereby influencing a set of states (Xatt), it can be assumed that it retains access
to these states while the defender tries to ensure that the system is resilient to the
attack by appropriately controlling the other states (Xdef ).
In the structural setting, this would imply that [Bdef ] will have fixed zeros in
rows corresponding to Xatt, and [Batt] will have fixed zeros in rows corresponding to
Xdef .
The resilience of the CPS will be characterized in terms of the structural
controllability of the system in the face of an attack. This will subsequently be
shown to be equivalent to formulating conditions on the non-attacked nodes in the
graph of the structured system. We shall assume that the sets Xdef and Xatt remain
unchanged with time. The system will be structurally resilient to an attack if it is
structurally controllable when it has ‘access’ to only some components of the state
vector, while the remaining components of the state vector (those under ‘attack’)
cannot be directly accessed by it.
We study the structural resilience of the system to two kinds of attacks:
1. During a denial-of-service attack, access to the inputs in uatt is blocked by
the attacker. Our goal will be to formulate conditions for structural resilience
assuming that only inputs in udef are available.
2. An integrity attack corresponds to the situation when a state feedback strategy
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(explained in greater detail in Section 6.4) is not implemented appropriately.
That is, only some components of the input are faithfully reproduced, while
the remaining are arbitrary.
At this point, we would like to point out two different ways of viewing a denial-
of-service attack. In the computer science and cybersecurity literature, a denial-of-
service attack typically occurs when an adversary ‘floods’ the system with spurious
inputs or requests, thereby ensuring that the system cannot address ‘genuine’ service
requests. In our framework, however, we view a denial-of-service attack in terms of
ensuring the structural resilience of the system when certain inputs (corresponding
to the attacker) are disregarded. A spurious input in our framework is assumed to
not be of use, and is therefore set to zero. We then want to see if the system can
satisfy certain properties in order to be structurally resilient to this attack in the
absence of these inputs.
Problem 6.2. Given the system (6.2) with ([A], [B]) structurally controllable be-
fore an attack, characterize its structural resilience to denial-of-service (DoS) and
integrity attacks.
This problem for a given numerical realization, (A,B) was solved in [31] for
several attack scenarios, and is stated below.
Problem 6.3. Given a particular numerical realization of the structured system,
(6.2), characterize its resilience to DoS and integrity attacks.
Structural controllability of the system before the attack ensures that the
cardinality of the input set is greater than the minimum number of inputs needed to
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ensure structural controllability [61]. This will play an important role in determining
the structural resilience of the system subsequent to an attack.
6.2 Structural Controllability
Before stating and proving our main results, we take a detour to present some
intermediate results that will be needed in subsequent sections.
Definition 6.4. Given the digraph representation of the system in (6.2), we define
the following terms [32, 49]:
• State stem: simple path comprising only state vertices, or an isolated state
vertex.
• Input stem: an input vertex linked to the root of a state stem.
• A chain is a single cycle or a group of disjoint cycles (composed of state ver-
tices) connected to each other in a sequence.
• A top assignable SCC of D([A]) = (X , EA) is a non-top-linked SCC which
contains at least one right unmatched vertex in a maximum matching. Since
a maximum matching is not unique, whether an SCC is top assignable will
depend on the maximum matching under consideration.
• The maximum top assignability index of D([A]) is the maximum number of
top assignable SCCs among the maximum matchings associated with B([A]).
• A dedicated input is an input that is connected to exactly one state. This
corresponds to a column of [B] having only one nonzero entry.
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The next three results present conditions for structural controllability, and
lower bounds on the number of control inputs and the links from these inputs to
unmatched state vertices and top assignable SCCs in order to ensure structural
controllability. The reader is directed to the references cited for proofs of these
results.
Theorem 6.5. [32, 49] The following are equivalent:
1. ([A], [B]) is structurally controllable.
2. Every state vertex is the end of a U−rooted path and there exists a union of a
U−rooted path family and a cycle family containing all vertices in X .
3. Every right unmatched vertex of a maximum matching of B([A], [B]) is con-
nected to a distinct input, and one state vertex from each non-top-linked SCC
of D([A]) is connected to some input.
Theorem 6.6. [61] Let m be the number of right unmatched vertices in a maxi-
mum matching of B([A]). Then, the minimum number of inputs needed to ensure
structural controllability is one, if m = 0, and m, otherwise.
Theorem 6.7. [32] Let β be the number of non-top-linked SCCs and α the maxi-
mum top assignability index in D([A]). Then, the minimum number of input-state
links needed to ensure structural controllability is m+ β − α.
The following example shows why the cardinality of the input set and the
number of links from the inputs to the states is important in ensuring structural
controllability.
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x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
u
Figure 6.1: x5 is unmatched. Each xi is an SCC
Example 6.8. Let A = diag{∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, 0}, as shown in Figure (6.1). Then, B(A)
has one right unmatched vertex, x5, giving m = 1. Therefore, one input connected
to x5 is required. However, the system has five strongly connected components,
giving β = 5. α = 1 since only one of the SCCs is top assignable. Therefore, the
minimum number of links from inputs to states to ensure structural controllability
is 1 + 5−1 = 5. Indeed, the input must be connected to all the states (to ensure that
no state is unreachable).
Example 6.9. Let us turn our attention to the first maximum matching (that is,
the edges in blue in Figure 2.3) of B([A]) in Example 2.13. We see that w3 and w5
in B([A]) correspond to v3 and v5 in D([A]), which both belong to non-top linked
SCCs, which makes these SCCs top-assignable.
From the preceding discussion, it is evident that one way to reduce the number
of input to state links needed to ensure structural controllability is to determine
a maximum matching of B([A]) in a way that as many right unmatched vertices
belong to non-top linked SCCs. This will ensure that β − α is ‘close’ to zero, and
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the minimum number of input to state links needed is ‘close’ to m, the number of
right unmatched vertices.
We conclude this section by defining what it means for an attack to be struc-
turally successful. The system post-attack is defined to be the configuration for
which structural controllability has to be ensured when only vertices in Xdef can be
connected to inputs.
Definition 6.10. An attack on the system is said to be structurally successful if
the system post-attack is not structurally controllable.
The system is structurally resilient to the attack if the system post-attack is
structurally controllable.
6.3 Structural Resilience to DoS Attacks
During a DoS attack, the attacker blocks access to inputs in uatt. The system
still has access to inputs in udef . Structurally, this corresponds to designing [Bdef ],
with [Batt] = 0, to ensure structural resilience. The system model is:
ẋ(t) = [A]x(t) + [Bdef ]udef (t) (6.3)
We assume that the number of right unmatched vertices, m, in a maximum
matching of B([A]) is nonzero. Let mdef and matt be the number of right unmatched
vertices in B([A]) corresponding to Xdef and Xatt (thus, mdef + matt = m). Let
l(P → Q) denote the set of links from P to Q. Lemma 6.11 provides a sufficient
condition for a DoS attack to be successful.
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Lemma 6.11. A DoS attack on the system in (6.2) is structurally successful if:
1. p ≥ m+ β − α OR
2. p ≥ m and |l(u→ X )| ≥ m+ β − α
and d < mdef , where p and d respectively denote the dimensions of u and udef .
Proof. ([A], [B]) is assumed to be structurally controllable before an attack occurs.
This means that there are at least m vertices in u and m+β−α links from u to X ,
which gives the inequalities in 1) and 2). The last inequality is obtained from the
fact that if, after an attack, the number of available inputs is less than the number
of right unmatched vertices in B([A]) corresponding to Xdef , then ([A], [Bdef ]) will
not be structurally controllable. Thus, the system will not be able to mitigate the
effect of the attack.
The conditions of Lemma 6.11 are not necessary, for an attack could be suc-
cessful even in the case when p ≥ m + β − α and d ≥ mdef . Though the minimum
input requirement is satisfied, the conditions to ensure structural controllability
must be carefully checked.
Lemma 6.12. If d ≥ mdef , a DoS attack is structurally successful if:
1. There exists an unreachable state from the vertices of udef . OR
2. There does not exist a disjoint union of udef rooted path families and cycle
families covering all the states. OR
3. |l(udef → X )| < mdef + β − α. OR
82
4. Every maximum matching of B([A]) has a right unmatched vertex in Xatt. OR
5. There is a non-top-linked SCC in D([A]) comprising only vertices from Xatt.
Proof. The first three conditions follow from Theorem 6.5 and Theorem 6.7. The
last two follow from the fact that inputs from udef cannot be assigned to vertices in
Xatt.
Gathering the results in Lemmas 6.11 and 6.12, we have the following result:
Theorem 6.13. Given [A] and the indices of [B] corresponding to [Bdef ], the sys-
tem in (6.3) is structurally resilient to a DoS attack if and only if ([A], [Bdef ]) is
structurally controllable and:
1. there exists a maximum matching of B([A]) that does not contain a right un-
matched vertex in Xatt;
2. D([A]) does not have a non-top linked SCC comprising vertices from only Xatt.
Proof. If ([A], [Bdef ]) is not structurally controllable, then at least one of the first
two conditions of Lemma 6.12 will not be satisfied, and the system will not be
structurally resilient to a DoS attack.
Now, let ([A], [Bdef ]) be structurally controllable. Any right unmatched vertex
in Xatt or a non-top-linked SCC consisting of only vertices in Xatt will have to be
assigned to a control in udef . This would violate the assumption that udef can only
be connected to states in Xdef . This means that the system will not be structurally
resilient to a DoS attack. If ([A], [Bdef ]) is structurally controllable, the absence of
right unmatched vertices or non-top-linked SCCs comprised exclusively of vertices
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from Xatt corresponds to the existence of a control configuration such that d ≥ mdef
and |l(udef → Xdef )| ≥ mdef + β − α, which ensures structural resilience to a DoS
attack.
Remark 6.14. This is different from the minimal controllability problem, where,
given [A], we need to find the sparsest [B] such that ([A], [B]) is structurally con-
trollable. In our framework, if the number of columns of [Bdef ] exceeds a certain
threshold (m), then the only remaining task is to fill in the ‘missing links’ to ensure
structural controllability. Conversely, structural controllability cannot be achieved if
the number of columns of [Bdef ] is below this threshold.
6.4 Structural Resilience to Integrity Attacks
State feedback is a popular control strategy in which the closed-loop poles of
a system can be appropriately placed in order to control the characteristics of the
response of the system. The control u(t) is a linear function of the state x(t), that
is, u(t) = Kx(t), and state feedback corresponds to placing the eigenvalues of the
modified system matrix (A + BK) in order to achieve a desired response. If the
system is controllable, these closed-loop poles can be arbitrarily placed.
During an integrity attack, only the control signals corresponding to the sys-
tem maintain their integrity, while those of the attacker are arbitrary. That is,
only the part of the input corresponding to udef is faithfully reproduced, while the
part corresponding to uatt is arbitrary. The attacker is successful if the system is
structurally controllable without needing to connect inputs to Xdef .
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Remark 6.15. Notice that in contrast to Definition 6.10, this notion of resilience
depends on the ability to connect inputs to Xatt, and not Xdef .
With [Adef ] := ([A] + [Bdef ][Kdef ]), the system model is:
ẋ(t) = [Adef ]x(t) + [Batt]uatt(t) (6.4)
The following result presents conditions for the system to be structurally re-
silient in the face of an integrity attack.
Theorem 6.16. The system in (6.4) is structurally resilient to an integrity attack
if and only if there is a right unmatched vertex in Xdef in every maximum matching
of B([Adef ]) or there exists a non-top-linked SCC of D([Adef ]) comprising exclusively
vertices in Xdef .
Proof. This follows from Assumption 6.1. The attacker will not be able to ensure
structural controllability of (6.4) if some vertex in Xdef has to be assigned to a
control in uatt.
Alternatively, through a measurement or other means (eg. changing a con-
troller parameter), an attacker might gain access to a state. We label this scenario a
state feedback integrity attack. In this case, uatt(t) = Kattx(t), while udef is arbitrary.
For structural systems, this corresponds to designing [Bdef ] to ensure structural con-
trollability. With [Aatt] := ([A] + [Batt][Katt]), we have:
ẋ(t) = [Aatt]x(t) + [Bdef ]udef (t) (6.5)
Let mA and mAatt denote the number of right unmatched vertices in a max-
imum matching of B([A)] and B([Aatt]). Let Z(H) denote the zero structure of a
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structured matrix H. A zero structure is therefore a particular configuration of
0s and ∗s. For structured matrices H and H ′ of the same dimension, we write
Z(H ′) ⊆ Z(H) whenever h′ij = 0 in [H ′] implies hij = 0 in [H].
The main result of this section provides certain guarantees on the structural
resilience of the system to a state feedback integrity attack depending on its resilience
to a DoS attack.
Theorem 6.17. If the system in (6.2) is structurally resilient to a DoS attack for
some [Bdef ] with zero structure Z(Bdef ), then there exists a [B′def ] which satisfies
Z(B′def ) ⊆ Z(Bdef ) for which it will also be structurally resilient to a state feedback
integrity attack. Moreover, if
mAatt + βAatt − αAatt ≤ mA + βA − αA (6.6)
for some [Bdef ] corresponding to the DoS case, then the same [Bdef ] will ensure
structural resilience to a state feedback integrity attack (here, m,β, and α are as in
Theorem (6.7)).
Proof. Addition of edges corresponding to [Batt][Katt] to [A] will ensure that the
number of right unmatched vertices in a maximum matching of [Aatt] can only be
as many as the number of right unmatched vertices in a maximum matching of [A].
Therefore, mAatt ≤ mA. From Theorem 6.6 and Equation (6.3), structural resilience
to a DoS attack implies d ≥ mA holds. This gives d ≥ mAatt .
If the inequality (6.6) holds, then |l(udef → X )| ≥ mAatt +βAatt−αAatt , and no
additional links between inputs and states will have to be added to ensure structural
controllability, and [B′def ] = [Bdef ]. Additional links will have to be added if (6.6)
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does not hold. This corresponds to adding free parameters to [Bdef ], giving [B
′
def ],
which satisfies Z(B′def ) ⊆ Z(Bdef ).
If the system is structurally resilient to DoS attacks and (6.6) holds, the same
configuration, i.e. [Bdef ], will automatically make it structurally resilient to state
feedback integrity attacks. However, there might be a cost involved in ‘turning
on’ controls to ensure structural controllability, and the system might want to be
resilient with the lowest cost. This would entail choosing a subset of the columns
of [Bdef ], indexed by I, to maintain structural controllability of ([Aatt], [Bdef (I)]),
while minimizing the cost of the control action.
It is important to note that structural resilience to DoS attacks guarantees
structural resilience only to state feedback integrity attacks. It does not, in general,
ensure structural resilience to arbitrary integrity attacks.
6.5 Computational Complexity
The computational complexity of determining the structural resilience of the
system under both denial-of-service and integrity attacks depends on two factors:
1. the complexity of determining strongly connected components in a directed
graph; and,
2. the complexity of determining a maximum matching in a bipartite graph.
Strongly connected components in a directed graph can be computed using
Tarjan’s algorithm [62]. This procedure uses depth-first search to push nodes onto
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a stack, and a bookkeeping procedure to ensure that nodes are visited exactly once.
The complexity of this procedure in the worst-case is linear in the cardinality of the
vertices and edges of the directed graph, that is O(|V|+ |E|).
A maximum matching of a bipartite graph can be determined by the Hopcraft-
Karp algorithm [63]. Each phase of this algorithm comprises one breadth-first search
and one depth-first search. Every phase increases the size of a partial matching by
determining augmented paths, which are paths of the graph that start and end in
vertices that do not belong to the matching, and in which the edges alternate be-
tween belonging to the matching and not belonging to it. The procedure terminates
when the graph has no augmenting paths. The complexity of this procedure in the
worst-case is O(
√
|V||E|). An extension for determining maximum matchings in
more general graphs with the same computational complexity was presented in [64].
6.6 Examples
In this section, we present illustrative examples to illustrate the results in
Sections 6.3 and 6.4. In all the examples, we will assume that x1, . . . , x6 ∈ Xdef and
x7, . . . , x10 ∈ Xatt.
Example 6.18. (DoS Attack Resilience) Figure (6.2a) shows the directed graph
representation of a system, D([A]). The SCCs are (x1, x2, x3), (x8), (x4, x5, x6, x7),
and (x9, x10). Inputs need to be asssigned to the first two SCCs, since they are
not top linked. Every maximum matching of D([A]) will have x8 ∈ Xatt as a right




Figure 6.2: Structural Resilience to DoS Attack
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Now, add the edge x7 → x8 to the digraph as shown in Figure (6.2b). The
SCCs are (x1, x2, x3), (x4, x5, x6, x7, x8), and (x9, x10). Only the first SCC is not top
linked, and there is only one right unmatched vertex in every maximum matching,
and for some such matching, it is not in Xatt. Therefore, this system is structurally
resilient to a DoS attack.
If the edge, x6 → x7 is removed as shown in Figure (6.2c), then (x7, x8)
becomes a non-top-linked SCC, which necessitates the assignment of a control to it,
making the system vulnerable to a DoS attack.
Example 6.19. (State Feedback Integrity Attack Resilience) In Figure (6.2a),
if a state feedback adds edges x7 → x8, x9 → x8, or x10 → x8, then there exists a
maximum matching of D([Aatt]) with no right unmatched vertices or non-top-linked
SCCs in Xatt, ensuring structural resilience to a state feedback attack.
For the system in Figure (6.2b), any state feedback [Katt]x will add edges to the
set {x7, x8, x9, x10}. We know that this graph does not have right unmatched vertices
in Xatt. This ensures structural resilience with the same [Bdef ] as in the DoS case.
It will be helpful to think of determining resilience to a state feedback integrity
attck in the context of a power system. The term [Katt]x can be thought of as ‘adding
wires’ to the system between nodes in the system (generators, loads, etc.) in order
to create redundancies. The addition of these wires will serve to reduce (or at least,
not increase) the number of right unmatched vertices in a maximum matching of
a bipartite graph representation of the system, which, as we have seen determines












Figure 6.3: Structural Resilience to Integrity Attack
such attacks at run-time, it is also the case that such systems are subject to regular
inspections. Such vulnerabilities that might become evident during an inspection
might be fixed during a maintenance period.
Example 6.20. (Integrity Attack Resilience) For [Adef ] given by Figures (6.2a,
6.2b, 6.2c), there is a non-top-linked SCC with vertices only in Xdef . Since controls
in uatt cannot be assigned to vertices in Xdef , the systems are structurally resilient
to an integrity attack.
However, if [Adef ] is as in Figure (6.3), all maximum matchings will have x8
as a right unmatched vertex, and x8 will be the only non-top-linked SCC. An attacker
can ensure structural controllability of the system by supplying an input to x8, and
the system will not be structurally resilient to an integrity attack.
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6.7 Extension to Switched Systems
The material in the previous sections can be extended to the case of switched
linear systems. In particular, it is important to note that a switched system can
be controllable even when each of its individual modes is not controllable. In this
section, we adopt the structured systems approach to study the resilience of switched
linear systems to denial-of-service attacks. Structural controllability of switched
linear systems was studied in [38], wherein the authors presented necessary and
sufficient conditions for structural controllability of a switched linear system in terms
of union graphs and colored union graphs. The problem of determining the smallest
subset of actuators needed to ensure controllability of the switched system was
studied in [39]. We leverage these results along with our results presented in Section
6.3 to establish conditions for a structured switched linear system to be resilient to
DoS attacks.
6.7.1 Switched Linear Systems
A switched system is composed of a family of subsystems and a rule that
governs switching among them. Consider the system:
ẋ(t) = Aσ(t)x(t) +Bσ(t)u(t) (6.7)
where x(t) ∈ Rn and u(t) ∈ Rp. σ : [0,∞)→ M := {1, . . . , z} is a switching signal.
M are the modes of the system, and σ(t) = i implies that the ith subsystem is active
at time t. In this section, each subsystem will be an LTI system.
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We will need several assumptions in the sequel.
Assumption 6.21. The switching signal σ(t) does not depend on initial states and
controls.
Assumption 6.22. There is only a finite number of changes of mode in every finite
time interval. This assumption is needed to rule out the Zeno phenomenon.
Assumption 6.23. All pairs of mode transitions are allowed. Further, there are no
constraints on the duration of time the system must spend in each mode.
The switched system is said to be controllable if for any initial state x(0) = x0
and final state x(tf ) = xf , there exists a switching signal σ : [0, tf ) → M and an
input u : [0, tf ) → Rp that transfers the system from x0 to xf . Similar to the
LTI case, a necessary and sufficient condition for the switched linear system to be
controllable is given by a rank condition.
Theorem 6.24. [43] The switched linear system in Equation (6.7) is controllable
if and only if the matrix
[B1, B2, . . . Bz, A1B1, . . . , AzB1, A1B2, . . . , AzB2, . . . ,
A1Bz, . . . , AzBz, A
2
1B1, A2A1B1, . . . , AzA1B1, A1A2B1,
A22B1, . . . , AzA2B1, . . . , A1AzBz, A2AzBz, . . . , A
2
zBz, . . . ,
An−11 B1, A2A
n−2
1 B1, . . . , AzA
n−2
1 B1, A− 1A2An−31 B1,
A22A
n−3
1 B1, . . . , A
n−3
1 B1, . . . , A1A
n−2
z Bz, . . . A
n−1
z Bz]
has full row rank n.
Let [Ak] and [Bk], k ∈ {1, . . . , z} correspond to the structural realization of
matrices Ak and Bk respectively. Therefore, [Ak] ∈ {0, ∗}n×n and [Bk] ∈ {0, ∗}n×p.
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We can associate a directed graph to each mode of the system. Let Dk = (Vk, Ek),
where Vk = Uk ∪ Xk and Ek = EAk ∪ EBk , where EAk = {(xj, xi)|[Ak]ij 6= 0},
EBk = {(uj, xi)|[Bk]ij 6= 0}, k = {1, . . . , z}.
Definition 6.25. The union graph of a collection of digraphs
Dk := D([Ak], [Bk]) = (Vk, Ek), k = {1, . . . , z}
is given by
D := (V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vz, E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ez)
Remark 6.26. Structurally, an edge eij in the union graph corresponds to a non
zero entry in the (j, i) position in at least one of the [Ak] (or [Bk]) matrices. The
absence of an edge eij from vertex i to vertex j in the union graph corresponds to the
case that the (j, i) entry in each of the [Ak] and [Bk] matrices is zero. Equivalently,
the union graph is a representation of the structured system defined by
([A1] + · · ·+ [Az], [B1] + · · ·+ [Bz]).
We will denote the union graph of structured matrices [M1] and [M2] by
D([M1] + [M2]). Following the notation used in [39], [ [M1], [M2] ] will denote the
concatenation of the matrices [M1] and [M2].
The following is a necessary and sufficient condition for structural controlla-
bility of the switched linear system.
Theorem 6.27. [39] A switched linear continuous time system is structurally con-
trollable if and only if the following two conditions hold:
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1. there exists an edge from an input in D([A1] + · · ·+ [Az], [B1] + · · ·+ [Bz]) to
a state vertex in every non top linked SCC of D([A1] + · · ·+ [Az]).
2. B([ [A1], . . . , [Az], [B1], . . . , [Bz] ]) has a maximum matching of size n.
6.7.2 Structural Resilience




u1 . . . ud ud+1 . . . up
)T
We shall use udef ∈ Rd and uatt ∈ Ra (with a := p− d) to collectively denote
the elements
(
u1 . . . ud
)T
and(
ud+1 . . . up
)T
respectively.
Then, the structural equivalent of Equation (6.7) can be written as:
ẋ(t) = [Aσ(t)]x(t) + [Bσ(t)def ]udef (t) + [Bσ(t)att ]uatt(t) (6.8)
Like in the single mode case, if Xdef and Xatt denote the (disjoint) sets of state
vertices that are accessible to the defender and attacker inputs respectively, then
[Bkdef ] will have fixed zeros in the rows corresponding to Xatt and [Bkatt ] will have
fixed zeros in the rows corresponding to Xdef .
During a DoS attack, the system is denied access to certain inputs, effectively
setting them to zero. In our model, this corresponds to the inputs in uatt. Struc-
turally, this corresponds to setting every entry of [Bkatt ] to zero for every mode
k.
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Assumption 6.28. The state vertices that the defender and attacker have accesss
to remains the same irrespective of the mode of the system. That is, the column
indices corresponding to [Bkatt ] is the same for every mode.
We pose the following problem:
Problem 6.29. Given that the system in Equation (6.8) is structurally controllable
before an attack, characterize its structural resilience to a denial-of-service attack.
As we will see, the solution to this problem will involve determining conditions
for ([A1], [B1def ], . . . , [Az], [Bzdef ]) to be structurally controllable. Let mdef and matt
denote the number of right unmatched vertices in B([ [A1], . . . , [Az] ]) corresponding
to Xdef and Xatt respectively.
Theorem 6.30. The switched system is structurally resilient to a denial-of-service
attack if and only if d ≥ mdef and:
1. D([A1]+· · ·+[Az]) has no non-top linked SCC comprised exclusively of vertices
from Xatt.
2. there exists a maximum matching of B([[A1], . . . , [Az]]) containing every vertex
in Xatt, that is, matt = 0 for some maximum matching.
3. every right unmatched vertex of B([ [A1], . . . , [Az] ]) in the maximum matching
above is connected to a unique input in udef .
4. every non-top linked SCC of D([A1]+ · · ·+[Az]) contains a vertex in Xdef that
is connected to some input in udef .
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Proof. If d < mdef , then there is some vertex in Xdef that does not have a ‘dedicated
input’ needed to ensure structural controllability (Theorem 6.6).
Now consider the case when d ≥ mdef , but D([A1]+ · · ·+[Az]) contains a non-
top linked SCC comprised exclusively of vertices from Xatt or if every maximum
matching of B([ [A1], . . . , [Az] ]) contains some vertex in Xatt. This would mean that
vertices in Xatt would have to be connected to a control in udef , which violates our
assumption that controls in udef can only be connected to states in Xdef .
The last two conditions are needed to ensure structural controllability of
([A1], [B1def ], . . . , [Az], [Bzdef ]).
Therefore, if any of the conditions are violated, the system will not be struc-
turally resilient to a DoS attack. This proves necessity.
For sufficiency, it is clear that if all the conditions are met, there exists a
control configuration which ensures structural controllability even when the system
(defender) can control only a subset of the states (i.e., those in Xdef ), and other
states (i.e., those in Xatt) cannot be directly accessed.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
This dissertation has addressed two problems in the broad area of the control
and security of cyberphysical systems.
We proposed a new framework for opacity for systems in which the state
and input variables take values from a continuous domain. Prior work in this field
studied notions of opacity only for systems in which the states were discrete. The
framework was built from the bottom-up in a natural way:
1. We started by formulating a notion of opacity for single-adversary LTI systems
called k-initial state opacity (k-ISO) in Chapter 3. A set of secret states was
defined to be k-ISO with respect to a set of nonsecret states if the outputs at
time k of every trajectory starting from the set of secret states could not be
distinguished from the output at time k of some trajectory starting from the
set of nonsecret states. Necessary and sufficient conditions to achieve k-ISO
were presented in terms of sets of reachable states. Opacity of a given DT-LTI
system was shown to be equivalent to the output controllability of a system
obeying the same dynamics, but with different initial conditions.
2. This was extended to the case when there was more than one adversarial ob-
server in Chapter 4, where we defined several notions of decentralized opacity.
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These notions of decentralized opacity depended on whether there was a cen-
tralized coordinator or not, and the presence or absence of collusion among
the adversaries. We established conditions for decentralized opacity in terms
of sets of reachable states. In the case of colluding adversaries, we derived
a condition for nonopacity in terms of the structure of the communication
graph.
3. Finally, in Chapter 5, we formulated notions of opacity for switched linear sys-
tems (SLSs). We distinguished between the cases when the secret was specified
as an initial mode, an initial state, or a combination of the two, and whether
the adversary observed a mode, a function of the state, or a combination of
the two. Constraints were placed on the modes that the system was allowed
to transition into from a given mode and we imposed bounds on the dwell
times in each mode. Moreover, constraints were imposed on the number of
changes of modes before the adversary made its observation in our definitions
of opacity for SLSs. In each case, we presented conditions that established that
particular notion of opacity. We also presented algorithmic procedures that
gave conservative upper bounds on the computational complexity to verify
these notions of opacity.
We then presented a characterization of the structural resilience of
cyber physical systems to denial of service and integrity attacks using
tools from linear structured systems and graph theory in Chapter 6. Conditions
for the system to be resilient were established in terms of unmatched vertices of
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bipartite graph and connected components of directed graph representations of the
structured system. An extension to the linear structured switched systems case was
studied and similar conditions needed to establish the resilience to denial of service
attacks were presented.
7.1 Future Directions
This section presents a (non-exhaustive) summary of the directions in which
the work presented in this dissertation can be extended. Specifically, we propose
developing notions of opacity for nonlinear systems, means of computing approxima-
tions of reachable sets, quantifying opacity, and several extensions to the structural
resilience problem.
7.1.1 Opacity for Nonlinear Systems
The nominal operation of many real-world systems relies on switching among
a set of modes whose dynamics are nonlinear. Consider the discrete-time nonlinear
system (DTNLS):
x(t+ 1) = f(x(t), u(t))
x(0) = x0 ∈ X0
y(t) = h(x(t)) (7.1)
where x ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rm, y ∈ Rp, and f(·, ·) and h(·) are sufficiently smooth functions
with h(0n) = 0p, where 0∗ is the 1× ∗ vector of zeroes.
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In a series of papers, the authors of [65], [66], and [67] derived conditions
under which a DTNLS could be transformed into a discrete-time linear system via
feedback. A geometric analysis of controllability of DTNLSs in terms of Lie algebras
of vector fields was presented in [68]. A linear algebraic framework for the analysis
of synthesis problems in DTNLSs was proposed in [69], where the notion of the rank
of an analytic discrete time system was developed. In a more recent work [70], the
authors studied input-to-state stability properties of DTNLSs, using well established
notions of input-to-state stability from the continuous time version.
Remark 7.1. [69] The analysis of continuous time nonlinear systems is largely
focused on that class of systems that is affine in the input (that is, of the form
ẋ(t) = f(x(t))+g(x(t))u(t)). The advantages that such a model offers are twofold: i)
the derivatives of the output depend polynomially on the inputs and their derivatives,
and ii) the vector fields involved have a nice structure (a drift term and m control
vector fields). Moreover, this class of systems is general enough to model many
practical nonlinear systems. However, the class of discrete time nonlinear systems
can also potentially include versions of continuous time systems that are sampled
in time, which necessitates considering the more general form of the DTNLS in
Equation (7.1).
Formulating notions of opacity for such systems will contribute to the develop-
ment of a comprehensive framework for opacity for general cyberphysical systems.
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7.1.2 Opacity and Reachable Sets of States
Recall that our definitions of opacity were different from well known definitions
of state observability and initial state estimation. Standard definitions of observ-
ability assume that the entire input and output sequences are known, and uses these
to verify if an initial state can be uniquely determined. In our framework, however,
we only have snapshots of the system output, and further, we do not exactly know
the inputs; we only have knowledge of the set of potential inputs. This necessi-
tated determining a reachable set of states at the time(s) the adversary made an
observation, in order to conclude opacity.
Exactly computing the set of reachable states for a dynamical system is not
easy. One method of exactly determining the set of reachable states at a time k
is from the Minkowski sum 1 of the reachable states at time k − 1 and the set of
states at time k (obtained from the system dynamics). However, the size of the
representation grows at each step, and the problem becomes intractable for large
time horizons. This necessitates the use of approximate techniques to compute
reachable sets.
Various techniques have been developed to compute over and under approx-
imations of sets of reachable states depending on how the initial set of states is
specified, including using support functions [71], zonotopes [58], and ellipsoids [57].
We present a brief survey of some of these techniques. Specifically, we are
interested in the following: the use of support functions in determining over ap-
1The Minkowski sum of sets S1, S2 ⊆ Rd is S1 ⊕ S2 = {s1 + s2 : s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2}.
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proximations of reachable sets for arbitrary compact convex sets of initial states,
and under approximations of the reachable set in the case when the initial set is
represented as a zonotope. These approximations are tight in the sense that the
approximate reachable set will touch the original reachable set at the points where
inequalities defining the approximate sets (to be made clear subsequently) attain
equality. The reader is referred to [72] for a succinct presentation of the techniques
used in computing reachable sets.
Let Ω ⊆ Rd be a compact convex set.
Definition 7.2. [71] The support function of Ω, denoted ρΩ : Rd → R, is defined
as ρΩ(`) = max
x∈Ω
`Tx.
A support vector of Ω in the direction ` ∈ Rd is a vector (need not be unique)
vΩ,` ∈ Rd such that vΩ,` ∈ Ω and `TvΩ,` = ρΩ(`).
The support function gives the distance of the supporting hyperplanes of Ω
from the origin. A compact convex set is uniquely determined by its support func-
tion, since Ω =
⋃
`∈Rd
{x ∈ Rd : `Tx ≤ ρΩ(`)}. Thus, the support function repre-
sentation is (essentially) dual of the intersection of hyperplanes representation of a
convex set.
A tight polyhedral overapproximation Ω̃ of an arbitrary compact convex set
can be got by ‘sampling’ its support function. The set Ω touches the faces of Ω̃ at
the points defined by the support vectors.
Proposition 7.3. [71] For all matrices A, all compact convex sets S1, S2 ⊆ Rp,
and all nonzero vectors ` ∈ Rd, with hull(S1, S2) denoting the convex hull of S1 and
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S2, the following properties hold:
ρhull(S1,S2)(`) = max(ρS1(`), ρS2(`))
ρS1⊕S2(`) = ρS1(`) + ρS2(`)
ρAS1(`) = ρS1(A
T `)
For a DT-LTI system, x(t + 1) = Ax(t) + Bu(t), x0 ∈ X0, u(t) ∈ U , where
X0 ⊆ Rn and U ⊆ Rm are compact convex sets, the set of reachable states at time
k is given by Ωk = AΩk−1 ⊕ BU, Ω0 = X0. Given r arbitrarily chosen directions,
`1, . . . , `r, a tight polyhedral overapproximation of Ωk, Ω̃k can be computed as the
intersection of halfspaces given by Hk,i = {x : `Ti x ≤ ρΩk(`i)}, i = 1, . . . , r. Thus,
computing the overapproximation is equivalent to evaluating the support function
along r directions. The complexity of an algorithm to compute the support function
presented in [71] is linear in the time horizon and polynomial in the dimension of
the state space.
Over- and under-approximations of the reachable set of states can also be
computed using zonotopes.
Definition 7.4. [58] A zonotope is a subset of Rn represented by its center u ∈ Rn
and its generators v1, . . . , vm ∈ Rn as:
(u,< v1, . . . , vm >) := {u+ Σmj=1αjvj : αj ∈ [−1, 1], j = 1, 2, . . . ,m}
A zonotope with m generators is said to have order m
n
.
The attraction in this case is the fact that the Minkowski sum of zonotopes
can be computed in O(n), independently of the order of the operands. The authors
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of [58] present an application of using polytopic under-approximations of zonotopes
in control synthesis.
Depending on how the initial set of states is specified, one can choose an
appropriate method to determine approximations of the set of reachable states at a
future time k.
An interesting problem is to extend this to computations of approximations
of the sets CXs(k) and CXns(k) to verify if k-ISO holds. The question to be
answered is how do set operations (susbet and intersection for strong and weak
k-ISO respectively) affect the accuracy of the approximation.
7.1.3 Output Controllability and Opacity
An equivalence between k-ISO and output controllability was established in
[40]. A notion of output controllability of a DT-SLS from a particular initial mode
has been defined in [60]. Establishing a similar equivalence for switched systems
under additional constraints on number of mode transitions and dwell times is more
subtle. The possibility of different switches of modes yielding the same output at
time k makes the analysis of comparing opacity with output controllability nontriv-
ial. It remains an interesting problem to study, nonetheless.
7.1.4 Quantitative Approaches to Opacity
Another interesting problem is to model the scenario when the adversary incurs
a cost to make an observation and has to decide on opacity by incurring as low a
105
cost as possible. The results in this dissertation have been qualitative in nature.
An interesting topic to pursue is methods of quantifying opacity, and investigate its
relation to the notion of differential privacy [73].
7.1.5 Structural Resilience
For the structural resilience problem, throughout this dissertation, we have
assumed that the system and the attacker have access to disjoint sets of nodes. One
direction of future research is to study structural resilience when there is a set of
nodes accessible to both defender and attacker.
In the switched systems case, we assumed that the sets of states accessible
to the defender and attacker remain the same for every mode. Future work will
investigate the case when the states accessible to each is possibly different for each
mode. Further, there were no restrictions on the allowed mode transitions or on
the duration of time the system could spend in each mode. Extending our work to
incorporate these restrictions is another area of interest. Alternatively, one could
associate probabilities with the transitions from one mode to another, and use this
to develop a notion of probabilistic structural resilience for switched systems.
Assuming that activating or disrupting an input-state link incurs a cost, there
are two scenarios that can be envisaged. First, when the system successfully thwarts
an attack, the attacker might want to ensure that the system incurs a high cost in
maintaining resilience, while keeping its own cost of carrying out the attack low. A
second problem of interest is to quantify the robustness of the system to the worst
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[19] Meera Sampath, Raja Sengupta, Stéphane Lafortune, Kasim Sinnamohideen,
and Demosthenis C. Teneketzis. Failure diagnosis using discrete-event models.
IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology, 4(2):105–124, 1996.
[20] Arjan J. Van Der Schaft and Johannes Maria Schumacher. An introduction to
hybrid dynamical systems, volume 251. Springer London, 2000.
[21] Robert R. Burridge, Alfred A. Rizzi, and Daniel E. Koditschek. Sequential com-
position of dynamically dexterous robot behaviors. The International Journal
of Robotics Research, 18(6):534–555, 1999.
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